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I TRADE, THEREFORE I AM: LEGAL PERSONHOOD INTHE
EUROPEAN UNION
CHARLOTTE O’BRIEN*
1. Introduction
EU citizenship is the subject of incremental and painstaking construction. In
allowing ourselves to get caught up with dissecting each separate instalment
that comes with each new case, we risk accepting without scrutiny what
should be a controversial ideological framework – that of an economic/market
citizenship. Within this framework, rights do not attach to personhood; rather
rights are triggered, interpreted, delineated and weighed according to a
miscellany of conditions. As a result, claimants can face “social welfare cliff
edges” – tipping them over the edge of the cliff, from full protection to none –
on the basis of apparently arbitrary tricks of circumstance. These vectors of
disentitlement mean that EU citizenship is not quite a unitary status, but more
a patchwork of personhoods. By vesting rights in criss-crossing conditions
rather than in people, we lose the person as a fundamental moral unit of our
social structure. In divesting the person of legal content, we risk divesting the
law of moral content – and our own judgement of questions of justice and what
is right.
The ECJ’s fragmentary approach to citizenship has been necessary due to
constraints of the legislature and Member State reticence regarding social
integration. But in our preoccupation with the fragments, we as legal
commentators keep the ideological framework of citizenship out of focus.
This framework of market citizenship, though it may not endorse, does permit
a parsimonious approach to implementation on the part of Member States,
who can prise open the gaps between statuses, roll out minimal, piecemeal
entitlements, and show little by way of social solidarity with, or concern for,
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the welfare or human condition of each other’s nationals. This suggests a very
minimal European commitment to social justice. In Zambrano,1 the ECJ
apparently emboldened the unconditional effects of EU citizenship status,
allowing it to grant an autonomous right of residence within the EU not
dependent on cross-border movement. But the case has sparked a restrictive
follow-up approach, in national measures, case law, and in government
interventions in subsequent ECJ cases – an approach which strips the right
down to something little more than actual presence, by withholding access to
social protection for workers reliant on Zambrano. This is hopefully not the
intention of the ECJ, who may yet ameliorate this particular injustice. But the
reality of EU citizenship experienced by some EU citizens is that host States
are unwilling to offer protection from destitution and are keen to use the gaps
in market citizenship to refuse benefits, including those directed at child
welfare and intended to alleviate child poverty – benefits often recognized as
the hallmarks of civilized society.
The current economic model of personhood is, or should be, contestable.
The gender tilts and gaps in EU welfare law – including provisions of
Directive 2004/382 which speak to a fear of a flood of pregnant migrants –
reveal a particular power dynamic rather than the free play of “natural” market
laws. This article therefore suggests that such a dynamic is not inevitable and
that it should be possible to explore different constructions of
citizenship-based rights, and different limitations that avoid unjust
discrimination. Market citizenship does more than “add to” a basic economic
minimal membership3 – it also precludes a full and humane depiction of
personhood, in which people are entitled to rights and to the healthy
enjoyment of those rights. Through emphasizing economic status, it is in line
with the EU wide shift in welfare policies to focus on duties to work, and the
responsibility of claimants not to become dependent on state benefits. The
discourse of responsibility is evident in the Union’s “soft” social policy
measures as well as national reforms. It redefines fairness4 because it vests
value in economic activity, and treats those not part of the labour market as
inactive, as targets to be activated.
1. Case C-34/09, Ruiz Zambrano, [2011] ECR I-1177.
2. Directive 2004/38 on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move
and reside freely within the territory, O.J. 2004, L 158/77.
3. On the added value of market citizenship see Nic Shuibhne, “The resilience of EU market
citizenship”, 47 CML Rev. (2010), 1597.
4. An example of linguistic capture explored in more detail in O’Brien, “From safety nets
and carrots to trampolines and sticks: The national uses of the EU as both menace and model to
help neoliberalise welfare policy”, in Schiek (Ed.), The EU Economic and Social Model in the
Global Crisis: Interdisciplinary Perspectives (Ashgate, 2013).
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While the activation process at national level has been the subject of much
struggle and political contestation, the process of stressing the responsibility
of EU migrants, vesting their rights and personhood in their economic status,
has been relatively straightforwardly accepted. This inevitably impacts upon
our understanding of fair access to social welfare, and makes us more
receptive at a national level to the basic premise that activation is ineluctable,
and responsibility the sine qua non of fair social resource allocation. Rather
than increasing the humane credentials of the EU, the rhetoric of citizenship
might inadvertently disguise inhumanity, helping to strengthen the hold of
economic personhood by infusing it with an authoritative moral glow. This in
turn blunts our perceptions of Member States’ uses of the personhood gaps –
here described as “xenosceptic” practices, since they imply suspicion of EU
migrants and lead to morally questionable outcomes.
How we define the person has a concrete bearing upon how we structure
society, and define and allocate welfare. The first section of this paper will
argue that much commentary on citizenship case law, whether positive or
critical, makes bigger claims than are yet warranted as to the
humanizing/enlightening effect of citizenship on Union law without seriously
challenging the ideological presumptions of market citizenship. Drawing
upon earlier scholarship on the then incipient EU citizenship, I submit that the
situation has changed – but not through the construction of a social Europe
anticipated5 or feared6 by some commentators. EU citizenship has more
refined components, and some welcome softened edges7 (especially with
regard to own-state nationals – indeed, it is arguable that the Court affords
stronger protection to the right to move for own-state nationals, than to the
right of equal treatment for non-nationals).8 But for non-national EU migrants
it is still essentially an economic citizenship. Rather than the avowedly
5. Note Mancini’s detection of “an evolution” and a judicial awareness of “certain
progressive forces” in the context of EU citizenship: “The making of a constitution for Europe”,
26 CML Rev. (1989), 607; more recent anticipation is evident in Azoulai, “‘Euro-bonds’: The
Ruiz Zambrano judgment or the real invention of EU citizenship”, 3Perspectives on Federalism
(2011), 31.
6. Hailbronner, “Union citizenship and access to social benefits”, 42 CML Rev. (2005),
1245; Tomuschat, annotation ofMartínez Sala, 37 CML Rev. (2000), 449; Somek, “Solidarity
decomposed: Being and time in European citizenship”, 32 EL Rev. (2007), 787.
7. So that, e.g., while a Member State may be entitled to deny a residence right to a
non-worker, it cannot deny them welfare benefits unless that residence right has in fact been
refused: Case C-456/02, Trojani, [2004] ECR I-7573, paras. 36–37. This has led to the creation
of a technical “right to reside” in the UK, whereby denial is unlikely to actually mean expulsion,
but is a means to refuse benefits: Larkin, “Migrants, social security, and the ‘right to reside’: A
licence to discriminate”, 14 Journal of Social Security Law (2007), 61.
8. See Case C-224/98, D’Hoop, [2002] ECR I-6191; Case C-192/05, Tas Hagen & Tas,
[2006] ECR I-10451; Case C-75/11, Commission v. Austria, judgment of 4 Oct. 2012, nyr;
Joined Cases C-523 & 585/11, Prinz & Seeberger, judgment of 18 July 2013, nyr; and O’Brien,
Legal personhood 1645
economic institution of the past, able to rebuke criticism on the grounds of its
naturally economic scope of action, its newer claims of a social dimension
distract attention from the fact that its economic foundations have still not
been excavated, that no transmogrification has taken place. So the premise of
market citizenship escapes relatively unquestioned while shaping social
policy and social agendas. Instead, criticism tends to focus upon competence
creep – effectively also endorsing the idea (while criticizing the practice) of
the EU becoming more of a “social” union.9 An alternative approach to the
case law is proposed here, highlighting the patchwork of personhoods created
by multiple rights cliff edges.
The increasingly fine-grained nature of the citizenship fragments and the
gradation of rights minimizing social welfare entitlement is demonstrated in
an analysis of national responses to the Ruiz Zambrano judgment; the UK is
presented as a case study, but with evidence to suggest that the UK
Government is not an isolated example. The inhumanity in question has two
key strands – withholding social protection rights from Zambrano families,
revealing indifference to child destitution; and refusals to consider Zambrano
residence claims where another parent is available, potentially demoting the
child’s best interests in questions of appropriate family living arrangements.
Market citizenship is not only problematic because it blocks a more social
alternative, but also because it contributes to an ideological linguistic capture
– a fixing of politically loaded meanings to ostensibly objective, neutral
words; “the market” and “economic” are associated with rationality while
being pre-loaded with patriarchal leanings. The second section of this paper
demonstrates the fabricated, non-neutral nature of an economic, migratory
personhood through an analysis of the gender gaps in free movement law,
noting that care and reproductive labour not only fall outside the definition of
work – the criterion by which the “person” is fully legally relevant in the EU –
but are also excluded from protected social security risks.They do not count as
permitted breaks in work,10 though pregnancy is about to be considered by the
ECJ in St Prix.11 The gendering of free movement law reveals not just the
stratification of EU legal personhood, but also some of the ideological
mechanics behind it. The current economic model utilizes the supposedly
neutral language of citizenship and responsibility to help rationalize its
exclusions. If we instead recognize the non-neutral effects of market
“Real links, abstract rights and false alarms: The relationship between the ECJ’s ‘real link’case
law and national solidarity”, 33 EL Rev. (2008), 643.
9. See Hailbronner, op. cit. supra note 6.
10. Art. 7(3) Directive 2004/38.
11. Case C-507/12, Jessy Saint Prix v. Secretary of State for Work and Pensions, pending.
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citizenship, we should ask whether a different orientation of rights and
limitations might be more appropriate and just.
The economic responsibility imposed on EU migrants echoes the EU-wide
agenda to activate those out of work through a series of punitive measures –
the responsibility model of welfare. This shared discourse is explored in the
third section. It is submitted that the neoliberal conceptual convergence
identified by O’Connell12 on a global scale is even more prominent and
explicit amongst the national welfare systems of EU Member States, who use,
or misuse, the concept of market citizenship to explain problematic exclusions
from EU social welfare law. This section explores how we have redefined
fairness in terms of competition instead of solidarity. In making claims about
fairness, market citizenship remodels concepts of humanity and morality.
These redefinitions might not have had the same purchase previously, when
EU citizenship made primarily economic ontological claims. Hence we have
come to tolerate a degree of disguised commodification and
instrumentalization of persons, as the market becomes not an alternative to
morality, but a form of morality itself, as evident in the elevation of market
freedoms to be equated with – if not prioritized over – human rights.
People gain their value and recognition through economic, mobile
citizenship, so that economic activity – or trading as termed in the title of this
piece – is the only surefire way to acquire meaningful personhood. That it is
the only guaranteed way to access rights of social protection, while all other
avenues and claims must be fraught with doubt, is, as Descartes said of the act
of thinking proving existence, “so certain and so assured that… I came to the
conclusion that I could receive it without scruple as the first principle”,13 in
this case, of the philosophy of the EU. But this begs the question as to where if
anywhere we go from here. While it is beyond the scope of this paper to
construct an alternative social constitution of the Union, it is submitted that if
we wish to grant meaningful, substantive rights to people, not economic units,
we must step back and be prepared to excavate the foundations of citizenship,
and to judge honestly what we consider to be just, right, and humane – an
assessment that should at least show that whatever that looks like, it is different
from what we have now. That means confronting Member State reticence to
embrace a social Europe and to protect each others’ nationals from destitution.
It also means challenging the veil of non-interference14 under which market
citizenship, in the hands of Member State authorities, influences not only
12. P. O’Connell “The Death of Socio-Economic Rights’ (2011) 74(4) MLR 532.
13. Descartes,Discourse on Method and Meditations on First Philosophy, Weissman (Ed.)
(Yale University, 1996), p. 21.
14. Which can act as a “veil for extensive and discretionary intervention”; Fine,
“Examining the ideas of globalisation and development critically: What role for political
economy?”, 9 New Political Economy (2004), 226.
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social policy but the very political, philosophical underpinnings of social
structures.
2. EU citizenship as a patchwork of personhoods
EU citizenship is quite a spectacle;15 it has done something not a great many
EU institutions do – captured imaginations (if not hearts),16 and brought out
the poetic and portentous17 in us. It is certainly brim full of possibilities.18
With each new case and each incremental change it is ever more tempting to
herald the increasingly social, humane Union.19 But such claims should be
moderated. Damjanovic argues that negative welfare integration has
established a “genuine social dimension” of the Union,20 and that is difficult
to dispute. But rather than asking whether that is a good thing or a bad thing,
it is necessary to take a step back and ask what conception of society is
encapsulated in this social dimension. It is here submitted that it does not take
15. Contributing to the “fundamental rulings” and “powerful expansion” of the scope of
free movement identified by Trstenjak and Beysen, “The growing overlap of fundamental
freedoms and fundamental rights in the case-law of the CJEU”, 38 EL Rev. (2013), 295.
16. As Dougan described constitutional developments in the Lisbon Treaty: “The Treaty of
Lisbon 2007: Winning minds, not hearts”, 45 CML Rev. (2008), 3.
17. E.g. Somek’s reference to decomposing solidarity, op. cit. supra note 6; Van Eijken and
DeVries, “A new route into the promised land? Being a European citizen after Ruiz Zambrano”,
36 EL Rev. (2011), 704; see also a summary of commentary summary, Kochenov, “The essence
of EU citizenship emerging from the last ten years of academic debate: Beyond the cherry
blossoms and the moon?”, (2013) ICLQ, 97.
18. “Citizenship becomes an epiphenomenon of how Europe is, or might be constituted
according to certain analytical typologies or ideal conceptions of capitalism, socialism and
democracy”: Bellamy, “The right to have rights: Citizenship practice and the political
constitution of the EU”, in Bellamy and Warleigh (Eds.), Citizenship & Governance in the
European Union (Continuum, 2001), p. 41.
19. Some optimistic examples include Downes’ description of Case C-85/96, Martinez
Sala, [1998] ECR I-2691 as “a tantalising prospect of Union citizenship as the source of
wide-ranging social rights which are not directly related to economic/market activity”: Downes,
“Market citizenship: Functionalism and fig leaves”, in Bellamy and Warleigh, ibid.; offering
similar assessments on subsequent cases see Golynker, “Jobseekers’ rights in the European
Union: Challenges of changing the paradigm of social solidarity”, 30 EL Rev. (2005), 111 (on
Case C-138/02, Collins, [2004] ECR I-2703); Lenaerts and Heremans, “Contours of a
European social union in the case-law of the European Court of Justice”, 2 EuConst (2006),
101–115 (on, among others, Case C-184/99,Grzelczyk, [2001] ECR I-6193); Kochenov, “A real
European citizenship; A new jurisdiction test; a novel chapter in the development of the Union
in Europe”, 18 CJEL (2011), 56 (on Ruiz Zambrano, cited supra note 1).
20. “The EU market rules as social market rules – Why the EU can be a social market
economy”, in this Review.
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us far from the original, once controversial21 logic of market citizenship. In
focusing on the separate, increasingly profuse, “bits and pieces”22 we risk
forgetting to question that logic.
Rather than fusing together to develop a “fundamental status” that
humanizes the Union, the separate increments added by different ECJ rulings
create a perforated personhood patchwork. The reach of each incremental
change is curbed, with Member State responses and the ECJ’s own follow-up
rulings delineating their boundaries and guarding the gulfs between them.
Although these gulfs may not form a part of the ECJ’s plans for a fundamental
shared destiny, nor accord with academic visions and interpretations of
citizenship, they form part of the legal environment within which claimants
experience being EU citizens. The gaps in this patchwork can tip
non-nationals into destitution, suggesting a fairly loose commitment to social
protection and social justice for non-nationals. As Splitter said of
postmodernism, “the fragmentation, displacement and pluralization
characteristic of post-modernist thinking, threatens to destroy the individual
subject and its identity”.23 The many characters of the EU citizen, with
variegated rights according to circumstance, similarly threatens to destroy the
individual subject – the person – as a legally relevant being, as we come to
accept steep status gaps and welfare cliff edges for nationals of other States;
gaps and losses not currently tolerated for own nationals. Without assigning
blame to the EU for Member State (mis)implementation, the remedy may lie
in the reframing of EU citizenship rights to anticipate and guard against
xenoscepticism.
EU citizenship means something – or at least, some things to some people.
Nural Ziebell makes clear that the very similar free movement scheme for
Turkish nationals is not to be regarded as exactly equivalent, since greater
protection from expulsion is to be expected for Union citizens.24 But beyond
that rather general assertion, it is not easy to pin down the rights enjoyed by
virtue of Union citizenship, as opposed to through economic, cross-border
activity. Citizens enjoy very different rights of equal treatment and access to
21. Everson, “The legacy of the market citizen”, in Shaw and More (Eds.), New Legal
Dynamics of European Union (Clarendon Press, 1995); Bellamy and Warleigh, “The puzzle of
EU citizenship”, in Bellamy and Warleigh, op. cit. supra note 18; Weiler, The constitution of
Europe: “Do the new clothes have an emperor?” and Other Essays on European integration
(CUP, 1999); Peebles, “A very Eden of the innate rights of man? A marxist look at the European
treaties and case law”, 22 Law & Social Inquiry (1997), 581.
22. The words of Curtin in “The constitutional structure of the Union: A Europe of bits and
pieces”, 30 CML Rev. (1993), 17.
23. Splitter, “Asking some hard questions about citizenship, morality and identity”, 12
Public Organization Review (2012), 261.
24. Case C-371/08, Nural Ziebell v. Land Baden-Württemberg, judgment of 8 Dec. 2011,
nyr, para 74.
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social protection depending on a whole host of circumstances – including
whether they are engaged in economic activity,25 and if so, whether they are
part of the “normal labour market”,26 and whether they have developed
sufficient “occupational aptitude”.27
Indeed, if you fall within the favoured category of genuine migrant worker
(or her family member), the Court seems so ardent in its wish to protect the
romantic, edifying bond of citizenship as to be affronted by the suggestion that
mere prosaic finances should get in the way. In Commission v. Netherlands,
the Court announced emphatically that it could not accept territorial
restrictions of a study allowance on the grounds of mere “budgetary
concerns”.28 To do so would imply something apparently patently absurd –
“that the application and the scope of a rule of EU law as fundamental as
non-discrimination on grounds of nationality might vary in time and place
according to the state of the public finances of Member States”.29 But the
self-evident truth about the consistency of the fundamental law of
non-discrimination dissolves when dealing with non-workers; the Court
distinguished Förster30 and Bidar,31 cases in which the Court had found that
Member States could impose their own integration requirement on students,
as the parties were not (at the material times) workers.32 In recent years the
ECJ has created the requirement that claimants demonstrate a real link with
host societies in order to be entitled to equal treatment as regards welfare,33
which seems more humane than an explicit economic/work link. However,
Commission v.Netherlands shows that the real link concept allows for priority
to be given to the economically active, while not binding Member States to do
much more than consider the claims of others. Hence the fact of participating
in the employment market “establishes… a sufficient link of integration” to be
entitled to equal treatment.34 This is because “through the taxes he pays…. the
migrant worker also contributes to the financing of the social policies of that
State”.35 As O’Leary asserted in 1995, in spite of a “progressive and human”
25. Whether they fit into Art. 7 of Directive 2004/38.
26. Case 344/87, Bettray, [1989] ECR 1621, Opinion of A.G. Jacobs, paras. 17 and 32; The
Court did not exactly reproduce the A.G.’s wording “normal labour market”, but spoke of
“employment under normal conditions” at para 18.
27. Case C-3/90,M.J.E. Bernini v.Minister van Onderwijs enWetenschappen, [1992] ECR
I-1071, para 16.
28. Case C-542/09, Commission v. Netherlands, judgment of 14 June 2012, nyr, para 58.
29. Ibid.
30. Case C-158/07, Förster, [2008] ECR I-8507.
31. Case C-29/03, Bidar, [2005] ECR I-2119.
32. Commission v. Netherlands, cited supra note 28, para 61.
33. O’Brien, op. cit. supra note 8.
34. Commission v. Netherlands, cited supra note 28, 65.
35. Ibid., para 66.
CML Rev. 20131650 O’Brien
approach to socio-economic rights, “the enjoyment of those rights has
generally been linked to their status as workers, to their performance of an
economic activity, or to their dependency on a worker”.36 D’Oliveira noted,
also in 1995, that the attachment of limitations and conditions to citizenship
rights “amounts to declaring that not every citizen has the right to move and
reside freely” and that the freedom of movement “for all nationals of Member
States, whether economically active as workers and self-employed or not” was
yet an “arcadian objective”.37 Many citizenship increments later it still is, but
that fact is better disguised. Universal social citizenship is not impossible, but
a reality check on how much progress has been made suggests that a
reorientation away from market citizenship is necessary for more ambitious
objectives – such as fortifying the connection between expanding citizenship
and fundamental rights as proposed by Von Bogdandy et al.38 – to become
attainable.
The citizenship increments have added more rights cliff edges: hence
citizens need to demonstrate real links with host societies;39 they may gain
access to rights if they have a connection to a former migrant worker; if
connected to a worker, their rights may depend on whether they have a child,
and if so, whether the child is of school age,40 and whether the worker was
employed or self-employed.41 If the citizen is temporarily out of work, their
36. O’Leary, “The social dimension of Union citizenship”, in Rosas and Antola (Eds.), A
Citizens’ Europe (Sage, 1995), p.162.
37. Jessurun d’Oliveira, “Union citizenship: Pie in the sky?”, in Rosas and Antola, ibid., pp.
69 and 70.
38. Von Bogdandy, Kottmann, Antpöhler, Dickschen, Hentrei and Smrkolj, “Reverse
Solange: Protecting the essence of fundamental rights against EU Member States”, 49 CML
Rev. (2012), 289.
39. See D’Hoop, cited supra note 8, and O’Brien, op. cit. supra note 8.
40. In order to rely upon the child’s right to education in Art. 12 of Regulation 1612/68 on
freedom of movement for workers in the Union: Case C-480/08, Teixeira, [2010] ECR I-1107
and Case C-310/08, Ibrahim, [2010] ECR I-1065. The relevant category of residence right on
the UK Border Agency Application for a Derivative Residence Card is called “Primary carer of
a child of an EEA national where that child is in education in the United Kingdom” – so the child
must actually have started school (other forms of integration do not seem to apply – nursery
school does not count according to the form – s. 5.28), possibly leading to differences in
treatment depending on the time of year of arrival, since “evidence of attendance” is required,
not just enrolment (s. 5.28). Form DRF1 Version 08/2013 at <www.ukba.homeoffice.gov.
uk/sitecontent/applicationforms/eea/drf.pdf> accessed 11 Aug. 2013.
41. Teixeira and Ibrahim draw upon the wording in Regulation 1612/68 so refer only to the
EU migrant’s pursuit of activities as an “employed” person in the host State giving rise to the
child’s right to reside to complete education, in turn creating a carer’s right of residence:
Teixeira, ibid., 44–45. The UK authorities are quite clear that this excludes self-employment –
see HMRC “TCTM02089 – Entitlement: Residence rules – Right to reside: Right to reside on
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rights may hinge on whether it is due to illness or to pregnancy.42 Citizens
joined by their third country national family member may have different
residence and equal treatment rights depending on whether they are relying on
Article 20 TFEU;43 whether they have another EU national family member;44
whether their subsistence is at risk, and if so, whether their residence risks are
in direct peril.45
It is the contention of this paper that access to social welfare entitlement is
the key right for assessing the content of EU citizenship and the credibility of
the “social” face of the EU.46 Such entitlement describes the degree of
obligation felt by Member States to protect individuals as human beings, and
so describes the degree to which individuals truly matter, or exist, for the
purposes of EU law – accepting Turner’s premise that “an individual is an
entity which has the capacity for rights and duties” and that “what it is to be an
individual is bound up with what it is to be a citizen”.47 Now, as much as when
Curtin made the observation, the “whole future and credibility of the
Communities as a cohesive legal unit which confers rights on individuals… is
at stake”.48 That each new ruling creates finer-grained fragments, and new
welfare cliff edges, is evident in the responses to a case purported to herald a
new fundamental rights based citizenship for the EU.49
2.1. The Zambrano aftermath
The finding that a third country national may have a subordinate EU right of
residence, so that their EU national child who has never left his/her EU
country of birth can continue to reside in the EU (since to find otherwise
basis of child in education in the United Kingdom”, at <www.hmrc.gov.uk/manuals/tct
manual/tctm02089.htm> last accessed 11 Aug. 2013.
42. I.e. whether they fit into Art. 7(3) of Directive 2004/38.
43. Following Ruiz Zambrano, cited supra note 1.
44. Following Case C-434/09,McCarthy, [2011] ECR I-3375 and Case C-256/11, Dereci,
judgment of 15 Nov. 2011, nyr.
45. Since the mere desirability of keeping a family together – for economic or human rights
reasons is not enough – Dereci, ibid.
46. There is not the space to fully justify this approach here; suffice to repeat Evans’
statement that “if it is to be at all meaningful, holders of Union citizenship must be equal in
relation to some matters of importance”, (Evans, “Union citizenship and the equality principle”,
in Rosas and Antola, op. cit. supra note 36, 86) and to add that it must require Member States
to extend solidaristic membership in matters of importance to non-nationals. The key
manifestation of national solidarity in EU Member States is social welfare, and the extension of
this solidarity is necessary if free movement is to be an accessible positive right for EU
nationals.
47. Turner, “Personhood and citizenship”, 3 Theory Culture & Society (1986), 6.
48. Curtin, op. cit. supra note 22, 67.
49. Azoulai, op. cit. supra note 5; Kochenov, op. cit. supra note 19.
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would result in the child effectively leaving the EU, and being deprived of their
rights as an EU citizen), exercised and excited commentators.50 But it has not
transformed Union citizenship, and the indications are that, until pushed to do
otherwise, Member States will read this judgment as narrowly as possible,
claiming the blessing of the ECJ via Dereci and McCarthy.51
Falling within the scope of Zambrano is difficult, so invoking the protection
of EU law is tricky, let alone establishing what that protection is. Dereci
offered some refinements to the concept of the denial of genuine enjoyment of
citizenship rights – that “it refers to situations in which the Union citizen has,
in fact, to leave not only the territory of the Member State of which he is a
national but also the territory of the Union as a whole”.52 The Court then
added, in a paragraph that has come to provide a mainstay for domestic rulings
in the UK,53 that “the mere fact that it might appear desirable to a national of
a Member State” for their Zambrano-reliant third country national family
member to be granted a right of residence “for economic reasons or in order to
keep his family together in the territory of the Union… is not sufficient in
itself to support the view that the Union citizen will be forced to leave Union
territory if such a right is not granted”.54 So a high degree of imminence and
causation is required between denial of the Zambrano right and departure
from the EU of the EU citizen.
The Court of Appeal of England and Wales has explicitly wondered, in the
Harrison judgment, whether there can be a “level of interference with the
right… short of de facto compulsion”, but “more than simply the breakdown
of family life”,55 concluding that Zambrano only “bites” where de facto
deportation of the EU citizen is at issue. Two problematic conclusions have
followed in different courts – firstly, that where another parent is not being
deported, the child cannot be said to be “forced” to leave the EU, even though
staying without the deported parent may be detrimental to the child’s best
interests. Secondly, the Zambrano right has been interpreted to afford little
more than a simple right to be present; denying social protection to an extent
that incurs destitution, and creates significant pressure to leave is not
compulsory deportation, so does not count, regardless of the inhumane
50. E.g. Van Eijken and De Vries, op. cit. supra note 17; Lansbergen and Miller, “European
citizenship rights in internal situations: An ambiguous revolution?”, 7 EuConst (2011), 287;
Nic Shuibhne, “Seven questions for seven paragraphs”, 36 EL Rev. (2011), 161; Hinarejos,
“Citizenship of the EU: Clarifying ‘genuine enjoyment of the substance’ of citizenship rights”,
71 CLJ (2012), 279; Kochenov, op. cit. supra note 17; Azoulai, op. cit. supra note 5.
51. Both cited supra note 44.
52. Dercei, ibid., para 66.
53. Harrison v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, [2012] EWCA Civ 1736, 27 –
noted at H22 that this Dereci finding was “highly pertinent”.
54. Dereci, cited supra 44, para 68.
55. Harrison, cited supra note 53, para 68.
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conditions this may create. As summarized inHarrison, the “right to reside in
the territory of the EU… is not a right to any particular quality or life or to any
particular standard of living”.56 This is an extremely minimal interpretation of
“genuine enjoyment” of a citizenship right – but the Court ofAppeal claims its
authority, viaDereci, from the ECJ.As Davies has noted, a citizen might not be
deported, so not deprived of a residence right, “but see the quality of it
diminished, by measures which make remaining painful, difficult, expensive,
or uncomfortable”.57
With regard to the apparent willingness to interfere adversely in family life,
the UK BorderAgency internal guidance instructs staff that “if there is another
person in the UKwho can care [not even who does care] for the British citizen,
then a derivative family permitmust be refused on the basis that such a refusal
would not result in the British citizen being forced to leave the EEA”.58 The
Application for a Derivative Residence Card59 indeed asks whether the
applicant is the only primary carer, and if there is another person in the UK
who “could or does assume caring responsibility for the British citizen”60 –
without making it clear that this is a “cliff edge” question, and asking for
several pages of details in the event of there being another potential carer. A
couple of post-Zambrano ECJ cases indicate that the UK is not the only
Member State to suggest that where a child could remain with another parent,
their removal is not sufficiently compulsory to justify a Zambrano right for the
deported parent. This position poses the risk that such assertions may be
crudely made, without a sensitive enquiry into the child’s best interests, as
would happen in a family court deciding custody.61 While the Court of Appeal
of England and Wales claimed in Harrison that the judge in the asylum and
immigration tribunal had had regard to the best interests of the child, there is
fairly mixed, unpromising guidance on how this regard should be
56. Ibid., para 67.
57. Davies, “The family rights of European children: Expulsion of non-European parents”,
(2012) EUI Working Paper No. RSCAS 2012/04, 13, as quoted in Harrison, cited supra note
53, 62.
58. UK BorderAgency “EUN01 – EEA nationals’ – EUN 1.12, at <www.ukba.homeoffice.
gov.uk/policyandlaw/guidance/ecg/eun/eun1/#header12>, last accessed 11 Aug. 2013.
59. See supra note 40.
60. Ibid., sections 3.14 and 3.15.
61. See the UK Ministry of Justice guidance on “Looking after children if you divorce or
separate” – <www.gov.uk/looking-after-children-divorce/after-you-apply-for-a-court-order>,
last accessed 11 Aug. 2013, “‘What judges and magistrates consider’: They’ll always put the
welfare of children first.They will think about the: child’s wishes and feelings; child’s physical,
emotional and educational needs; effect any changes may have on the child; child’s age, gender,
characteristics and background; possible risk of harm to the child; ability of parents to meet the
child’s needs”.
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demonstrated or how heavily it should weigh.62 And little guidance is to be
gleaned from ECJ cases Iida63 and O&S.64
In Iida, the ECJ concluded that the right to “genuine enjoyment of the
substance of the rights associated with their status of Union citizen” (deriving
from Zambrano), did not help a third country national who was not living in
the same Member State as his spouse and EU national daughter. The Court
found rather simply that the genuine enjoyment of the daughter’s citizenship
rights were not impeded – pointing out that the claimant was not seeking to
live in the same Member State as her (Austria), but in Germany, and that he
had not hitherto relied upon an EU based right to reside and this had not
hindered his daughter’s ability to move and reside freely.65 While attention has
rightly been drawn to the rather Zambrano-twisting statement that reliance on
Articles 20 and 21 TFEU must have an “intrinsic connection to freedom of
movement”,66 it is also worth highlighting that the key deciding factor here
seems to be the choice of State of residence of the claimant. The daughter had
moved and so could claim to fall squarely within EU law more easily than
static citizens. If the claimant had moved, but to a different State to that of his
daughter, he would have been in no better situation.The key was that he should
move to the same Member State as her – though in that case he could have
relied upon Directive 2004/3867 – in order to lend credibility to the suggestion
that the daughter’s continued residence in the EU might be affected by his
expulsion. The Court essentially decided that potential deportation from the
EU would not force the daughter to leave the EU, because she lived in a
different country from her father anyway. But there is a great deal of difference
between having a parent in a bordering EU country, and having a parent in
Japan. Moreover, what of couples who happen to live either side of a border,
both within the same frontier zone? It is not clear how detailed an investigation
was conducted into ascertaining the daughter’s connections, and likely future
decisions, or even the effect upon her welfare of being left with one parent
only.
62. Sanade and others (British children Zambrano – Dereci), [2011] UKUT 48 (IAC) (16
Feb. 2012);MA and SM (Zambrano: EU children outside EU) Iran, [2013] UKUT 380 (19 July
2013); R (on the application of Tinizaray) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department,
[2011] EWHC 1850 (Admin) (25 Oct. 2011) and ZH (Tanzania) v. Secretary of State for the
Home Department, [2011] UKSC 4, [2011] 2 AC 166.
63. Case C-40/11, Iida, judgment 8 Nov. 2012, nyr.
64. Joined Cases C-356 & 357/11, O&S and L, judgment of 6 Dec. 2012, nyr.
65. Iida, cited supra note 63, 74.
66. Iida, ibid., para 72 – the subject of analysis by Reynolds, “Exploring the ‘intrinsic
connection’ between free movement and the genuine enjoyment test: reflections on EU
citizenship after Iida”, 38 EL Rev. (2013), 376.
67. Iida, ibid., para 64.
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The Court was similarly brief in its foray into family structure and
organization in O&S, which dealt with the deportation of third country
national step-fathers of EU citizen children. In assessing whether such
deportation would prevent the EU national children from exercising their
citizenship rights, the Court announced that “the fact that the third country
nationals for whom a right of residence is sought are not persons on whom
those citizens are legally, financially or emotionally dependent must be taken
into consideration”.68 But it is not clear from what evidence such a finding
should be made with regard to emotional dependence. Nor is it clear whether
any weight should be given to potential financial dependence – e.g. where the
deportee has good chances of employment and the potential to support a
family who would otherwise be reliant upon the public purse, which was
claimed to be the case in L.69
The limiting of Zambrano to children in McCarthy70 seems to have been
accepted by default,71 even though the expulsion of a third country national
may well effectively compel the departure from the EU of an adult EU citizen
– for instance, if the deportee is a spouse, or the carer of an adult with
disabilities. UK regulations refer to a “primary carer”,72 and the Zambrano
section of the application form for a derivative residence card requests
evidence of the relationship, “for example, birth certificate/adoption
certificate”,73 so it suggests that parental relationship – or some family
proximity – is required in addition to care. It also requests evidence of
dependency, “for example, how the child or adult is wholly reliant on the
68. O&S and L, cited supra note 64, para 56.
69. Ibid., para 29.
70. McCarthy, cited supra note 44.
71. Note the summary in para 46 ofO&S and L, cited supra note 64, of the Zambrano ratio:
“With respect, finally, to the right of residence of a person who is a third country national in the
Member State of residence of his minor children, nationals of that Member State, who are
dependant on him and of whom he and his spouse have joint custody, the Court has held that the
refusal to grant a right of residence would have the consequence that those children, who are
citizens of the Union, would have to leave the territory of the Union in order to accompany their
parents”. See also the summary in Iida, cited supra note 63, para 62: “in order for a parentwho
is a third-country national to have a right of residence under Union law which is derived from
primary law, effective exercise of the Union citizen’s legal position would have to be harmed
substantially if the parent who is a third-country national were denied a right of residence.
Accordingly, a parent who is a third-country national was found to have a right of residence –
in the same Member State, it should be noted, as that in which the minor was residing – for
example where ‘a refusalwould lead to a situation where … children … would have to leave the
territory of the Union’, or where otherwise ‘the child’s right of residence [would be deprived]
of any useful effect’”. Emphasis added.
72. The Immigration (European Economic Area) (Amendment) (No. 2) Regulations 2012,
S.I. 2012 No. 2560.
73. UK Border Agency, op. cit. supra note 40 (section 3.12).
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primary carer(s) for their care”,74 but it is not clear what care threshold, or
relationship evidence, would be required for an adult care recipient.
A restrictive approach to Zambrano is evident in subsequent interventions
to ECJ cases made by several national governments:75 curbing the increments
of citizenship case law is not just the preserve of the UK Government.76 But it
is something at which the UK Government is really rather adept. Following
Zambrano, UK legislation has been altered, firstly to recognize a Zambrano
right of residence,77 and secondly, to strip those reliant upon that right of
access to social protection, including housing assistance78 and Child
Benefit.79 It is difficult to square the measures with a sense of societal
responsibility for the well-being of children and a duty not to financially
victimize lawfully resident individuals. Even budgetary concerns do not hold
much persuasive sway, given that the Government’s own impact assessment of
the EEA and Habitual Residence Regulations 2012 stated that fewer than 700
Zambrano carers had applied for residence by October 2012.80 However, the
Government stated that the benefit restrictions strike “a proportionate means
of achieving the legitimate Government aim of encouraging migrants who can
make a valuable contribution to our economy, whilst deliver fairness for the
taxpayer by maintaining the current level of support the benefit system is able
to provide to the general population”.81
While a deserving/undeserving migrant bifurcation is problematic in itself,
since it commodifies migrants,82 it is here bereft of its own logic, because the
Regulations exclude Zambrano carers from benefits even though they are
working. So “fairness” is clearly only applicable to some taxpayers. Hence the
74. Ibid. (section 3.13).
75. E.g. in O&S and L the Finnish, Danish, German, Italian, Netherlands and Polish
governments; see supra note 64, 37.
76. A point made by Whiteford about social policy generally in 1995: “while the UK
objections to Community action in the social field appear to have been consistent
and predictable, the positions taken by other MS diverge significantly from their public
affirmations of support for the social dimension. Particularly when qualified majority voting
was possible, blame for the weak texts cannot be laid solely at the door of the British”.
Whiteford, “Whither social policy?”, in Shaw and More, op. cit. supra note 21, 117.
77. See note 72 supra.
78. The Social Security (habitual residence) (amendment) regulations 2012.
79. The child benefit and child tax credit (miscellaneous amendments) regulations 2012
S.I. 2012 No. 2612.
80. Department for work and pensions (DWP), “Access to benefits for those who will have
a ‘Zambrano’ right to reside and work equality analysis for the social security (habitual
residence)(amendment) regulations 2012”, Oct. 2012, at <www.gov.uk/government/up
loads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/220217/eia-zambrano-right-to-reside-and-work.
pdf>, last accessed 11 Aug. 2013, 2.
81. Ibid., 3.
82. The problems of a commodification-based approach to rights are explored below, in
sections 4 and 4.1.
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legal advice service, Birmingham Law Centre (now sadly closed down),83
noted that it is impossible for working clients on low incomes to take up
tenancies without access to Housing Benefit. The Law Centre added that
Zambrano clients wanting to work were “hamstrung by the prospect of not
being able to earn the kind of salary that will cover… rent and living expenses”
and are without “the kind of support available to other low income families”.84
This kind of targeted exclusion is harder to defend when calling to mind the
root of a Zambrano claim – typically the right of residence of an EU national
child. That child’s welfare is very likely to be significantly impaired by lack of
access to housing, or to benefits directly aimed at protecting the well-being of
children, such as Child Benefit. UNICEF describes combating child poverty
as “more than a slogan or a routine inclusion in a political manifesto: it is the
hallmark of a civilized society”.85 Excluding the children of immigrant
parents from protection could in effect exclude some of the more vulnerable
children in society,86 the fate of whom, Chomsky has suggested “offers a
sharper measure of the distance from here to something that might be called
‘civilization’”.87 The indications are that we seriously risk compromising our
claims to civilized social behaviour in the wake of Zambrano.
Zambrano carers and their children are thus caught in a contradiction. They
have a right of residence by virtue of Zambrano, but poverty is thought not to
jeopardize their residence right. Hence, as long as they are resident,
(exercising a right derived from EU law) they are not facing de facto
deportation and so are not considered to be in a Zambrano situation, so the
situation is treated as not within the scope of EU law, and not within the scope
of the Charter of Fundamental Rights.88 Statements in the High Court of
England and Wales in Sanneh89 confirm that protection from poverty is not in
itself part of the Zambrano residence right, even for those who are working.
83. Sadly, because the UK’s second largest city now does not have a law centre. See the Law
Gazette, <www.lawgazette.co.uk/news/birmingham-law-centre-closes-cash-runs-out>, last
accessed 11 Aug. 2013.
84. Birmingham Law Centre blog: 23 Feb. 2013, “Zambrano and Pryce: Does the
homelessness duty mean anything?”, <www.birminghamlawcentre.org.uk/wordpress/?p=61>,
last accessed 11 Aug. 2013.
85. UNICEF Innocenti Research Centre, “Measuring child poverty: New league tables of
child poverty in the world’s rich countries”, 10 Innocenti Report Card (2012), UNICEF
Innocenti Research Centre, Florence, 4.
86. On the disproportionate representation of migrant families among children living in
poverty, see Rutter, “Migration, migrants and child poverty”, 138 Poverty (2011), 6.
87. In Chomsky, Profit over People: neoliberalism and global order (Seven Stories Press,
1999), part IV, “Market democracy in a neoliberal order; Doctrines and reality”.
88. “EU law is simply not engaged at all: there is no EU law right that requires the protection
of this court, now”. R. (on the application of Sanneh) v. Secretary of State for Work and
Pensions, [2013] EWHC 793 (Admin), 103.
89. Ibid.
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Indeed, the ability to work is in itself seen as sufficient protection – which is
clearly problematic when considering areas of high living costs, the cost of
childcare, low incomes, job instability, and the added costs of being a lone
parent and/or working part time. These costs impact disproportionately upon
Zambrano carers, who statistically are likely to be lone parents: the UK
Government’s impact report on the welfare reforms notes that of the
Zambrano residence claims “94 percent have not made their claim with a
partner, suggesting they are lone parents”. Zambrano families thus fall into
several poverty risk groups – since lone parents and immigrant families are at
greater risk of poverty.90
The claimant in Sanneh had had different benefit claims refused one by one,
so that for a while all she and her child had coming in was a small amount
(about £43 per week, apparently erratically paid) of child support from her
child’s father. Yet this deprivation was used against her, as “without any
significant public assistance” it was found that she had been “surviving”.91
Therefore, it could not be said that refusing benefit was depriving her of her
residence right, since she hadn’t yet left the country as a result of destitution.
Destitution would only play a part if in fact it compelled a claimant to leave –
but this is surely quite an arbitrary measure. How much destitution a person
chooses to “accept” may depend on a number of factors – including having no
“home” to go to, or having mobility options impaired by e.g. illness of the
child. In tolerating child poverty, it seems that the UK has used the patchwork
principles and gaps in market citizenship to distil from Zambrano a lower
grade of EU citizenship.
Other Member States may be engaging in similar Zambrano-demotion
tactics. A recent judicial finding in the Netherlands suggests that as long as
claimants are “not deprived of all means of subsistence” it cannot be said that
denying benefits such as Child Support, another child-directed benefit, will
require them to leave or compromise their enjoyment of their right to reside.92
The Dutch court did mention the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child,
but only to invoke the Netherlands’ reservations and to dismiss the instrument.
Dutch courts also seem to have suggested that there is a very high tolerance for
the statutory reorganization of families to avoid a Zambrano right being
engaged – indicating in another case that a claimant had not sufficiently shown
that her child’s residence was dependent upon hers, because it could be
possible for the child to live with the father, notwithstanding the parental
separation, and the fact that the mother was the primary carer with custody.93
90. DWP, op. cit. supra note 80, 2.
91. Sanneh , cited supra note 88, 50, 58.
92. ECLI: NL: 2012: BY3982, Arnhem court 13 Nov. 2012.
93. ECLI: NL: 2012: BY0833, Council of State 17 Oct. 2012.
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A high burden of proof seems to be implied for demonstrating total
dependence on the mother and impossibility of transferring custody – which is
rather intrusive into the organization of family life, without much
investigation into the best interests of the child. As this high burden of proof
had not been discharged, the case fell outside the scope of EU law, so EU
human rights obligations did not apply.
Given the chorus of negative interventions in Zambrano94 and subsequent
cases on the limits of the Zambrano right, Dereci95 and O&S,96 it seems
plausible that many Member States will similarly adopt restrictive measures as
to the social welfare rights of Zambrano residents unless and until directed
otherwise. Market citizenship permits this use of personhood gaps and does
not promote concern for social justice where non-nationals are concerned.
While this may be attributed to the natural limits of the scope of EU law, and
deference to national competences, it is important to remember that scope and
competence are not determined according to an inexorable, divine law. Rather,
they reflect malleable and man-made power relations, as the next section aims
to show through an exploration of the gendering of migrant worker status, and
so of citizenship and EU legal personhood.
3. Stratified rights – The gendering of economic mobility
While the Zambrano aftermath demonstrates the problem of excluding some
citizens and their family members from basic social protection rights, the
theoretically archetypal,97 economically active, mobile man – around whom
citizenship rights have materialized – is not an inevitable, neutral, or “natural”
selective tool. Since it requires a degree of economic wherewithal, education
in one’s rights, and (often) foreign language literacy, mobility itself is a highly
economically selective criterion for rights, as noted by Reynolds.98 It is
internally stratified according to anachronistic and exclusionary reference
94. Zambrano, cited supra note 1, Rapport d’audience – the governments of the following
countries invited the Court to give negative responses to the questions: Belgium, the
Netherlands, Poland, Germany, Austria, Denmark, Greece, and Ireland (with Poland confining
itself to invite the Court to declare it did not have competence to address the questions).
95. Dereci, cited supra note 44, hearing report.
96. O&S and L, cited supra note 64, hearing report: the governments of the following
countries invited the Court to give negative responses to the questions: Denmark, Germany,
Italy, the Netherlands, Poland and Finland.
97. Bothfeld and Betzelt critique the “ideal-typical model of economic citizens who strive
to maximize their economic utility”; see “Introduction”, in Betzelt and Bothfeld (Eds.),
Activation and Labour Market Reforms in Europe Challenges to Social Citizenship (Palgrave,
2011).
98. Reynolds, op. cit. supra note 66, 389.
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points. The requirement to be “part of the normal labour market”99 creates
difficulties for persons in sheltered accommodation, regardless of the
economic productivity of their work,100 while those performing unpaid work,
informal care work, or reproductive work (predominantly women) are lesser
persons – facing rights cliff edges, regardless of the societal economic subsidy
those people provide.101 Despite a broad definition of migrant work, in 1994
it still tethered social rights to “the male breadwinner conceptualization of the
family” according to Ackers, and it still does now.102 Where apparent
exceptions appear, e.g. providing residence rights to primary carers via
Teixeira and Ibrahim,103 they may be narrowly drawn, and in any case they
derive from economic migratory activity – the EU migrant’s work when
his/her child was “installed” in the Member State. The very concept of child
“installation” may give rise to more rights disaggregation and cliff edges,
depending on whether the child in question is of school age.104
Yet economic mobility provides the trigger for one’s citizenship to come
into fruition – occupying the place, according to Somek, “held by solidarity in
a national context”, to the extent that it creates a “teleological fix” in the case
law that “eclipses the relevance of justice”.105 It is also a tautological fix in
which the exclusions justify themselves; care and pregnancy are gaps in the
free movement framework because they are not work; and they are not work
because work does not include unpaid reproductive labour.
3.1. The care gap
Reproductive labour is consistently demoted and disregarded within
European free movement law as non-economic activity,106 with the work of
carers for children and for disabled adults registering upon the legal landscape
only in certain circumstances, with carers at best recognized if they are
99. Bettray, cited supra note 26.
100. See O’Brien, “Social blind spots and monocular policy-making: The ECJ’s migrant
worker model”, 46 CML Rev. (2009), 1107.
101. The economic value of carer contributions in the UK has been estimated to amount to
“a remarkable” £87 billion per year, Buckner, and Yeandle, Valuing carers – calculating the
value of unpaid care (Carers UK, 2007), p. 1. For further evidence on the care subsidy, see
O’Brien, “Confronting the care penalty: The case for extending reasonable adjustment rights
along the disability/care continuum”, 34 Journal of Social Welfare and Family Law (2012), 5.
102. Ackers, “Women, citizenship, and European Community law:The gender implications
of the free movement provisions”, 16 Journal of Social Welfare and Family Law (1994),
393–394.
103. Teixeira and Ibrahim, both cited supra note 40.
104. On distinctions created by the cases, see O’Brien case note on Ibrahim& Teixeira, 48
CML Rev., 203.
105. Somek, Individualism (OUP, 2008), p. 225.
106. Note Case C-77/95, Züchner, [1996] ECR I-5689.
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dependent upon – or have rights that are derivative107 from – another. Hence in
order to claim equal treatment rights which make the “enjoyment” of EU
residence rights more than a right to destitute presence, but healthy, humane
enjoyment of that residence, they must be the family members of migrant
workers, or be charged with the care of the EU national child of a
current/former migrant worker (as in Teixeira and Ibrahim).
The fact that such people do not attract rights in themselves leads to
potentially arbitrary distinctions – so that someone present in a host State for
four and a half years, with a couple of pre-school age children, may face a
welfare cliff edge as compared to someone present for a few months whose
child is enrolled in school. It amplifies the distorted meaning given to the word
“dependence” when much economic activity, as was partly recognized in
Carpenter,108 depends on the family unit and care given within, rather than
merely bankrolling it.109 And it leads to the treatment of the carer as a shadow,
or ex utero vessel, an appendage to the child, who, so long as they are “the right
sort” of EU child110 – born to a migrant worker, in school – has a
comparatively full legal personal identity.
We have not come far from the finding in Züchner111 that unremunerated
care work, whatever level of competence required, and however full-time,
cannot be recognized as economic activity. There, the Court did acknowledge
that often care requirements for persons who become incapacitated “must be
provided by an outsider in return for remuneration if there is no one else,
whether or not a member of the family, who will do so without payment”.
Given that such paid activities are frequently funded by statutory social and
care services, this effectively concedes that unremunerated care workers
subsidize Member States. But the Court went on to say that including them in
the definition of economic activity “would have the effect of infinitely
extending the scope of the directive, whereas the purpose of Article 2 of
[Directive 79/7/EEC] is precisely to delimit that scope”.112 So the Court
equates coverage of unremunerated care to a total absence of limits – making
it clear how ingrained is the adherence to the traditional model that
107. See the UK BorderAgency application for a derivative residence card, cited supra note
40; the first three categories of applicants are carers.
108. Case C-60/00, Carpenter, [2002] ECR I-6279; Editorial comments, “Freedoms
unlimited? Reflections on Mary Carpenter v Secretary of State”, 40 CML Rev. (2003), 537.
109. Carpenter, ibid., 39 – A detriment to family life would also be a detriment “to the
conditions under which Mr Carpenter exercises a fundamental freedom”.
110. Nic Shuibhne, “(Some of) the kids are all right: Comment onMcCarthy and Dereci”,
49 CML Rev. (2012), 349.
111. Züchner, cited supra note 106.
112. Ibid., para 15; referring to Council Directive 79/7 of 19 Dec. 1978 on the progressive
implementation of the principle of equal treatment for men and women in matters of social
security, O.J. 1979, L 6/24.
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“economic” just ceases to make sense if conceived of differently.113 This is in
spite of the breadth of approach to Article 2 of the EEC Treaty taken in
Steymann114 in which unpaid odd jobs that might indirectly contribute to the
economic life of a closed religious community in return for services (such as
bed and board) could constitute economic activity.
Leaving aside this conceptually messy contradiction between unpaid care
and unpaid odd jobs, it is of course problematic to characterize care as an
economic activity, since we may not want to commodify more people.115 But
carers are already commodified under the system of free movement, and are
found to be value-less. It is through attaining the status of the migrant worker
that one graduates to full EU citizenship. Control over that status is both
crucial and exclusionary. However, even if we do not try to attach monetary
value to unpaid care work, EU law does not just disregard the work-like nature
of care by excluding it from the definition of work. It goes further – care is
treated as less significant and less valuable than illness, since care is not only
excluded from the definition ofwork, but also from the definition of permitted
breaks in work.
The provision for retention of worker status for EU migrant workers in
Article 7(3) of Directive 2004/38 allows workers to be temporarily out of work
due to involuntary unemployment, illness or accident without losing their
worker status. This status is vital for their personal recognition and
entitlements within the host State system – since citizenship alone confers
little by way of social protection guarantee. A study on the national
conformity of different Member State laws with Directive 2004/38
emphasized that worker status and its protection under Article 7(3) was
“especially important”116 because those with worker status “can never become
an unreasonable burden”, so are entitled to full equal treatment and “have
more rights under Article 24(2)” than those with a different status. Article 7(3)
does not provide for retention of worker status when temporarily out of work
due to care obligations, which is a mostly female social security “risk”.117
113. O’Brien, op. cit. supra note 100.
114. Case 196/87, Steymann, [1988] ECR 6159.
115. And we may not want to suggest that the “rewards and satisfactions” reported by many
carers must be translated into remuneration: Glendinning, et al., “Care provision within
families and its socio-economic impact on care providers”, (2009) Report for the European
Commission DG EMPL Working Paper EU 2342.York, University of York social policy
research unit.
116. Conformity Study of Directive 2004/38/EC on the right of citizens of the Union and
their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States
(Milieu Ltd. in consortium with the Europa Institute, 2008): The Netherlands.
117. On the gendering of care: Pickard, “Informal care for older people provided by their
adult children: Projections of supply and demand to 2041 in England”, (2008) Report to the
Strategy Unit and Department of Health. London, personal social services research unit.
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As a consequence, years on from Züchner, we see in Dias the treatment of
care as a rights cliff edge: there, the claimant had a period of “not working”118
while caring for her child, who had been ill. While acknowledging that her
childcare responsibilities had been exacerbated by the child’s illness, and by
domestic violence, the Court of Appeal in England and Wales characterized
her caring period as “perfectly comprehensible but voluntary”119
unemployment.The questions referred to the ECJ centred on the acquisition of
permanent residence, using periods of “lawful” (i.e. employed) residence
before the transposition of Directive 2004/38, and/or adding periods together
from either side of a “not lawful” – i.e. not remunerated – period of residence.
The Court did not dispute the characterization of the claimant’s care periods as
voluntary unemployment leading to a loss of lawful residence, but found that,
where the claimant had a prior period of residing and working for five years,120
subsequent periods without a right to reside of less than two years should not
affect (though not count towards) the acquisition of permanent residence – i.e.
the clock should not be automatically turned back. The Court claimed that
such periods were analogous to periods spent outside the host State – provision
for which was made in the Directive,121 and had been clarified in Lassal.122
So the best that unremunerated care workers can get in terms of recognition
is to be treated as people not present, as absences. InDias, the ECJ stated that
the “integration objective” of the permanent residence provision “is based not
only on territorial and time factors but also on qualitative elements, relating to
the level of integration in the host Member State” (para 64); however,
arguably, it is not based on territorial or time factors at all if the only decisive
“qualitative” element of integration is remuneration.
Were Article 7(3) Directive 2004/38 to cover temporary periods of care,
then those with work patterns punctuated by fluctuating care responsibilities
could retain worker status during those periods, rather than face an automatic
rights cut-off. The Court of Appeal of England and Wales seemed to suggest,
in Dias, that the floodgates argument – that eternal last resort of social and
legal conservatives123 – prevented the legislature from considering the
coverage of carers in Directive 2004/38, noting that “the circumstances of a
parent, of either sex, who gives up employment to care for a child but
118. Case C-325/09, Dias, [2011] ECR I-6387, para 23.
119. As expressed by the Court ofAppeal of England and Wales: Secretary of State forWork
and Pensions v. Dias, [2009] EWCA Civ 807 [2010] 1 CMLR 4; 20.
120. She was not entitled to permanent residence on the basis of these 5 years since they
included time completed before the transposition of the Directive.
121. In Art. 16(3).
122. Case C-162/09, Lassal, [2010] I-9217.
123. It was also invoked in Züchner, cited supra note 106.
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anticipates a return after some as yet unknown time are very common”.124 The
implications are that it would extend rights to an unmanageable degree, and
that the “unknown time” element would add too much complexity and
threaten indefinite benefit claims. However, there is no reason to suppose that
temporary care responsibilities should be more open-ended than temporary
sickness, or less susceptible to a statutory time limit. Moreover, it is the very
commonplace nature of the activity that suggests that the co-ordination
scheme is poorly adapted to the reality of female working lives. Just
suggesting that the exclusion of care from Article 7(3) Directive 2004/38
strikes an appropriate balance between “the interests of migrants and of host
States and their taxpayers”125 fails to appreciate that it is in fact taxpayers –
female workers in atypical work patterns – who are being excluded. This
gender tilt is even more evident in the pregnancy gap: another exclusion from
Article 7(3).
3.2. The pregnancy gap
Pregnancy and maternity126 do not feature inArticle 7(3) of Directive 2004/38
as a permitted temporary break during which worker status may be retained.
As a consequence, the lower courts of England and Wales have rejected claims
for social assistance from women with sick babies, who left their jobs during
pregnancy and were deemed to lose worker status. They intended to return
to work in spite of temporary delays due to infant illnesses. According to
decision makers, the Directive was not meant to allow such women to
temporarily retain worker status and their rights cut-off is intentional on the
part of the Union.
One case in which this reasoning was startlingly clear is the Social Security
Commissioner case CIS/3182/2005.127 There, the claimant’s plans to seek
work were interrupted by her child’s illness and intensive care requirements.
The Commissioner (Mark Rowland) outlined what he saw as the policy
reasons for disallowing benefits in such a situation – essentially to avoid the
UK becoming financially responsible – stating that it was legitimate to “put
pressure on people to leave the United Kingdom”.128 The Commissioner went
on to accept that the claimant might not have been able to simply go back to her
124. Dias, cited supra note 119, 21.
125. Ibid.
126. Which are here treated as part of the same process recognizing that pregnancy and
birth should entail a post-birth period of not working. See infra note 144.
127. Decision date 1 Sept. 2006, available at <www.administrativeappeals.tribunals.
gov.uk/judgmentfiles/j2043/CIS%203182%202005-00.doc>, last accessed 11 Aug. 2013.
128. Ibid., 14.
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home State, as “it might have been impossible for her to travel to Holland
while the child was ill in hospital”. But he found that even so, she should not
be entitled to support while in the UK, because at an earlier point “she had
known she was pregnant”, and at that point, by staying in the UK assumed the
risk of being without support in the event of not being able to work or to return
to Holland at a later date. In other words, she voluntarily assumed the risk of
having an ill child, “so it cannot be said that she had not previously had the
opportunity to return to Holland where she would have been entitled to
benefit”.129 The message derived from Directive 2004/38 is a remarkable one
– that women’s free movement rights and choices are to be curtailed, on
becoming pregnant, because at that point risks arise of having to stop work,
and of delays in returning to work.
The Directive does make some acknowledgement of pregnancy in the
provision on permitted breaks in residence for the purposes of acquiring
permanent residence rights in a host State. Article 16(3) allows for one period
of absence of up to 12 months “for important reasons such as pregnancy and
childbirth” etc. The absence of a provision in 7(3) to enable women not
working due to pregnancy and maternity to stay in the host State, combined
with some protection if they return temporarily to the home State all seem to
point towards a pregnancy centrifuge – negative incentives to go back home
until resumption of actual work allows for resumption of worker status.
A case currently pending before the ECJ, St Prix, also involves a migrant
worker who gave up her job in the later stages of pregnancy, as her work was
physically demanding. Her baby was ill at birth, delaying her return to work,
though she did in fact return to work when the baby was three months old, so
the period of claim for social assistance was quite short, in spite of her baby’s
heart condition which caused it to die when a year old. Her claim for income
support during the period she was out of work was refused, and appeals to the
First Tier Tribunal and Upper Tribunal dismissed on the ground that she did
not have a right to reside deriving from EU law, with Judge Ward concluding
that the omission of pregnancy in Article 7(3) was “a deliberate one”.130 The
appeal to the Court of Appeal was also dismissed.131 The case has been
appealed to the Supreme Court, which has referred the issue to the ECJ.132
129. Ibid., 17.
130. Pointing to the legislature’s choice not to take up the amendment including pregnancy
in the provision, as proposed by the Committee on Women’s Rights and Equal Opportunities;
Secretary of State for Work and Pensions v. JS [2010] UKUT 131 (AAC), 22.
131. JS v. Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2011] EWCA Civ 806.
132. Jessy Saint Prix v. Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2012] UKSC 49. Case
C-507/12, pending.
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Although the Court of Appeal contends that the exclusion discriminates
lawfully133 on the grounds of a right to reside,134 in fact it discriminates on the
grounds of sex. Pregnancy and maternity directly and only concern women,
and compared to illness, inevitably entail some incapacity for work – as well as
a period during which paid work is not desirable. In a powerful judgment
accompanying the Supreme Court’s referral to the ECJ, Hale SCJ argued in
favour of worker status retention, noting that the need for some post-birth
period of not working is reflected in UK welfare law “not only for the sake of
the mother but also for the sake of her child”.135 It would be open to the Union
to establish a longer appropriate maternity period than that reflected in the
provisions quoted by Hale SCJ, since a finite period of statutory maternity
leave for discontinuous workers need not cost more to the public purse than
that provided for continuous ones.136
The pregnancy gap is an example of structural sex discrimination
reinforcing existing power relations,137 and entrenching the stratification of
EU personhoods. Pregnant women are perceived as greater threats to the
benefit system, so less “responsible”,138 and ultimately, because of the loss of
worker status, less complete persons than sick men. In the context of illness
and involuntary unemployment, a small amount of work can legitimately give
rise to retained worker status and entitlement to benefits for an unknown
period. In Vatsouras and Koupatantze, Mr Koupatantze made a claim for
social assistance on the basis of retained worker status having been made
unemployed after less than 2 months’work; the ECJ found that even in the face
of limited remuneration and a short duration of work, worker status could not
be ruled out, which would in turn lead to coverage by Article 7(3).139
133. I.e. with justification.
134. JS, cited supra note 132, 21, suggesting the case is “manifestly” not one of direct
discrimination.
135. Saint Prix, supra note 133, 19: since UK nationals are not required to seek or be
available for work from 11 weeks before the expected date of confinement until 15 weeks after
the pregnancy has ended: regulation 4ZA and para 14 of Schedule 1B to the Income Support
(General) Regulations 1987 (SI 1987/1967).
136. Those in continuous employment would be drawing Statutory Maternity Pay, which in
the UK is in effect mostly paid by the State; HMRC (2012), Employer Helpbook For Statutory
Maternity Pay, E15 Crown copyright, <www.hmrc.gov.uk/helpsheets/e15.pdf>, last accessed
11 Aug. 2013, p. 14. “Recovering SMP”. Indeed Income Support for discontinuous workers
could cost less as SMP is paid at a flat rate whereas Income Support is comprised of a basic
allowance and topped up depending on circumstances.
137. Kay, Gaucher, Peach, Laurin, Friesen, Zanna, and Spencer, “Inequality, discrimination,
and the power of the status quo: Direct evidence for a motivation to see the way things are as the
way they should be”, 97 Journal of Personality and Social Psychology (2009), 421.
138. See section 3 infra.
139. Joined Cases C-22 & 23/08, Vatsouras and Koupatantze, [2009] ECR I-4585, paras.
30–31.
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Pregnant migrants, in contrast, are subject to greater suspicion, with
pregnancy treated as a badge of benefit tourism. Stanley Burnton LJ in the
Court of Appeal commented that finding in favour of the claimant could lead
to non-nationals coming “to this country in an advanced state of pregnancy, [in
order to] work for a week as an agency worker, stop work (with no continuing
employment contract), and then be entitled to income support”.140 Such
assumptions condone systemic hostility towards, and repelling of, migrants
who are or become pregnant. There are many reasons why employment comes
to an end – a worker may be on a fixed term contract,141 or her activities may
be too physically onerous to continue during pregnancy, and it is possible that
in a small business no alternative employment is available. Or, she may have
made an advance flexible working request and had it denied – since fairly
dilute national provisions142 and non-existent EU ones143 do not create a right
to flexible working.144 Thus rigid work arrangements might be unsustainable
in the face of prohibitively expensive and inflexible child care options.145 So,
knowing that her job will be incompatible with having a child, she may feel
compelled to resign and look elsewhere, being channelled out of full time
work and into a select few labour sectors.
The treatment of a pregnancy-break as an act of civic irresponsibility, and
grounds for demotion of status and EU-identity, is difficult to defend morally,
and calls into question the purported rationality – and implied inevitability –
of market citizenship. The fear that pregnant migrants, unlike sick ones, will
140. JS, cited supra note 132, 25.
141. The claimant in JS was an agency worker – ibid., para 2. Agency/fixed term/atypical
workers are more likely to have difficulties “in relation to managing pregnancy in the
workplace” and so their employment contract is made more precarious by pregnancy: James
“Law’s response to pregnancy/workplace conflicts”, 17 Feminist Legal Studies (2007), 175.
142. Amounting to a rejectable right of request: for parents of young and disabled children
see the Employment Act 2003; for carers of adult dependents see the Work and Families Act
2006 (s. 12(2)(ii)) and the Flexible working (eligibility, complaints and remedies) (amendment)
regulations 2006, (SI 2006/3314).
143. Notwithstanding rhetorical drives to do something about reconciling work with care
duties: in 2006 the European Commission declared a need to explore reconciliation action
including “leave to care for elderly parents or disabled family members”: European
Commission, “Communication from the commission: First stage consultation of European
social partners on reconciliation of professional, private and family life”, SEC(2006)1245, 10.
144. A study by the National Childbirth Trust found that 16% of flexible work requests
made by respondents resulted in no change in working patterns, and 7% changed their
employer. National Childbirth Trust, The experiences of women returning to work after
maternity leave in the UK: A summary of survey results (2008), 12.
145. Tomlinson, “Gender equality and the State: A review of objectives, policies and
progress in the European Union”, 22 The International Journal of Human Resource
Management (2009), 3767; Tomlinson, Olsen and Purdam, “Women returners and potential
returners: Employment profiles and labour market opportunities: A case study of the United
Kingdom”, 25 European Sociological Review (2009), 349.
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do a bit of work in order to qualify for benefits belies the fact that pregnancy
and maternity punctuate continuous working lives. Women are already by
default – and in line with Union objectives146 – in the labour force anyway
before pregnancy,147 and most do not view having children as a cut-off point,
or the trigger for a lengthy work break. The Secretary of State submitted in
St Prix that Article 7(3) should not cover pregnancy because “some women,
once pregnant, may never return or intend to return to work”.148 This attitude
is widely shared by employers – a study cited by the NHS found that “The
majority of employers who responded to the survey (64%) did not expect
women to return to work after maternity leave regardless of their role within
the organization”.149 But this belief is a generation out of step; decades old
studies over the last few decades have shown that women are highly likely to
return to working after their maternity period. The Policy Studies Institute
findings in 1997 suggested that not only were they likely to go back to work,
but that they were taking less maternity leave than in previous years, possibly
due to financial concerns but also career concerns,150 neither of which are
likely to have dampened down since then. A US study in 1998 that focused on
women who were working prior to childbirth suggests that those expressing
intentions to be only temporarily out of work can be trusted to act on those
intentions.151 A study in Germany found that those in part time work (who may
be characterized as having done “a bit of work”) were actually more rapid
returners to the labour market.152
146. The Lisbon Strategy set specific targets for increasing the female employment rate.
The Lisbon Strategy 2000–2010: an analysis and evaluation of the methods used and results
achieved, DG Internal policies: Employment and social affairs (2010) IP/A/EMPL/
ST/2008-07, 12.
147. Employment rates for women age 20–64 in the EU in 2010 were 62.1% compared to
overall employment rates of 68.6%: Eurostat: News release “Labour force survey employment
rate for those aged 20 to 64 in the EU27 decreased to 68.6% in 2010”, 96/2011 – 29 June 2011.
148. St Prix, cited supra note 133, 17.
149. NHS Health for work blog at <www.health4work.nhs.uk/blog/2011/08/mothers-retur
ning-work-maternity-leave/>, last accessed 13 Aug. 2013.
150. In 1997 it was found that “Two thirds of mothers now return to work after having a
baby”. See Policy studies institute University of Westminster, Press release date: 30 June 1997,
at <archive.psi.org.uk/news/pressrelease.asp?news_item_id=63>, last accessed 11 Aug. 2013.
151. Glass and Riley, “Family responsive policies and employee retention following
childbirth”, 76 Social Forces (1998), 1401. The number of women who expressed a plan to start
work in a different job after a maternity period – so in a similar situation to the claimant in St
Prix – was very close to the number who actually did exactly that – 21.75% and 21.05%
respectively (most intended to, and did, remain in their current job), 1416.
152. Ondrich, Speiss, Yang and Wagner, “The liberalisation of maternity leave policy
and the return to work after childbirth in Germany”, 1 Review of economics of the household
(2003), 99.
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The pregnancy gap touches directly on the fracturing of EU personhood. As
the ECJ has noted, unless governed at EU level, there is the risk that worker
status may be modified by Member States willing to “eliminate at will the
protection afforded by the Treaty to certain categories of person”,153 but we
have here one large category of person, women, being accorded an
automatically more precarious status.Although one of the recitals of Directive
2004/38 states that the Directive “respects fundamental rights and freedoms
and observes the principles recognized in particular by the Charter of
Fundamental Rights of the European Union”,154 the Commission has
elsewhere asserted that gender equality is not just “about having well written
statements”, and “cannot be something you add on … by saying for example
‘we don’t discriminate’”.155 The Directive’s equality credentials cannot
simply be established in a recital.
However, it is possible that the Directive left it open to Member States to fill
the gaps – that it does not prohibit coverage of pregnant migrants, since the
recital added that “Member States should implement this Directive without
discrimination between the beneficiaries of this Directive on grounds such as
sex”. Moreover, the judgments in Baumbast156 and Mangold,157 and the
implementation duties in the Charter of Fundamental Rights158 taken together
may be read as creating a duty for Member States to interpret EU and national
legislation in such a way as to avoid discriminatory effects,159 for instance by
reading extra categories into Article 7(3). But there are no signs that Member
States have recognized that there are gaps to be filled. The conformity study
mentioned above shows rather close adherence to the wording in the Directive
in implementing acts, or in some cases vague wording appearing to offer
153. Case 75/63, Hoekstra, [1964] ECR 177, 1.
154. Directive 2004/38, Recital 31.
155. European Commission, EQUAL Guide on Gender Mainstreaming Employment &
European Social Fund (2004), 9 and 5 at <ec.europa.eu/employment_social/equal/data/
document/gendermain_en.pdf>, last accessed 11 Aug. 2013.
156. Case C-413/99, Baumbast, [2002] ECR I-17091.
157. Case C-144/04,Mangold, [2005] ECR I-9981.
158. Art. 51(1) on scope to include implementation of EU law & Article 21(1) on the
prohibition of discrimination on grounds of sex. O.J. 2000, C 364/01; in Case C-45/12, Office
national d’allocations familiales pour travailleurs salariés (ONAFTS) v. Radia Hadj Ahmed,
judgment 13 June 2013, nyr, the Court stated that “the fundamental rights guaranteed in the
legal order of the European Union, including the Charter, are applicable in all situations
governed by European Union law”, 56.
159. Given that non-discrimination is a “general principle” of Union law, Mangold, cited
supra note 157, 75, and limitations on the free movement of workers created by secondary
legislation must be applied nationally in accordance with the general principles of Union law,
Baumbast, cited supra note 156, 94. See also Case C-555/07, Kücükdeveci, [2010] ECR I-365
on duties of national courts to disapply discriminatory national provisions.
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protection to fewer people than the Directive does.160 The UK interpretation
of the Directive appears to be in line with the Directive’s wording. The
conformity study picks up on one omission,161 but “for the rest” of regulations
dealing with Article 7(3), which must include the non-coverage of
pregnancy/maternity, “it could be said that the UK legislation is at least as
generous as the Directive”.162
The Article 7(3) pregnancy gap is an extreme example, and may be soon
partly closed – though probably with another “patch” that will be curbed by
Member States, since it is doubtful whether it will encompass a right to a
decent period of maternity leave, and/or periods of unpaid care (for children or
sick/disabled adults). And the prospect of recognizing the labour value of
these activities as not just breaks in work but actually as work seems
vanishingly small under existing arrangements. The EU free movement
framework is centred around a gendered conception of economic activity – a
conception that has been criticized as giving scant recognition to reproductive
labour,163 defining those out of the labour market as inactive, and dependent
“no matter how fully engaged or responsible for others they may be”.164 Free
movement and equal treatment are arguably the core citizenship rights, yet are
asymmetrically enjoyed, according to an economic profile which is not gender
neutral and prevents women from feeling the full protection of EU citizen
status;165 this impacts upon the value and recognition of persons. As Collier et
al note, (referring to, and using the spelling of, Thomas Hobbes) “Once all
‘men’are declared ‘equall’, then those who are manifestly not equal cannot be
‘men’”.166 Within the free movement framework, women are manifestly not
equal, and therefore are not quite the EU citizens that men are.
The language of citizenship is thus deployed in the way that Hervey
described the language of universalism in 1995 – that is, “to reinforce and
perpetuate existing social and political arrangements, in particular the
160. Conformity Study, cited supra note 116.
161. The regulations do not specifically cover those in a fixed term employment contract of
less than a year or who become unemployed during the first year.
162. Conformity Study, cited supra note 116: United Kingdom.
163. Moebius and Szyszczak, “Of raising pigs and children”, 18 YEL (1998), 125.
164. Williams, “Good-enough principles for welfare”, 28 Journal of Social Policy (1999),
676.
165. Currie, “The transformation of Union citizenship”, in Dougan and Currie (Eds.), 50
years of the EuropeanTreaties: Looking Back andThinking Forward (Hart, 2009); Morgan and
Stalford, “Disabled people and the European Union: Equal citizens?”, in Barnes and Mercer
(Eds.), The Social Model of Disability: Europe and the Majority World (The Disability Press,
2005).
166. Collier, Maurer and Suárez Navaz, “Sanctioned identities: Legal constructions of
modern personhood”, 2 Identities (1997), 10.
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position of the dominant in those arrangements”.167 The gendered
stratification of rights reflects a segmentation of citizens in which rights are
vested in particular activities, and not in people, so that a person’s self-hood
on the European stage is contingent upon those activities. Where the economic
fulcrum has a tendency to exclude people along potentially unsavoury lines of
selection – such as gender and disability – it is submitted that we should
recognize and criticize these effects, and consider whether alternative means
of allocating and limiting rights would be more morally coherent.
Market-centric citizenship both draws from and feeds into the EU wide
responsibilization and activation paradigm, explored in the next section. The
construction of personhood for migrants helps to normalize similar principles
in EU soft welfare policy, and rationalize them according to a particular
conception of fairness – making rights more contingent upon economic
duties, and making persons responsible for their poverty.
4. Responsibilization and the redefinition of fairness
Market citizenship does not connote a collective sense of solidarity, or of
shared endeavour,168 but is founded upon an individualistic approach to social
problems – those migrants who cannot work are deemed irresponsible, fall out
of favour with host Member States, and fall through the protection gaps. We
are faced with something paradoxical – an atomistic, rather than societal,
citizenship. EU citizenship, it seems, does not provide the answer to social
injustice within Union law. Splitter notes that concepts of patriotism,
nationalism and citizenship are loaded with “heavy and potentially divisive
language” unnecessary for urging “the appropriate moral point”,169 but it is
possible that the heavy and divisive strata created from EU citizenship are not
just unhelpful, but prevent us from urging appropriate moral points.
Those personhood strata speak to a responsibilization discourse, in which
social protection is subsidiary to economic/employment policies. The
responsibilization paradigm, and the consequent impact upon personhood, is a
natural fit for a system premised on freedom; as Collier et al. note, “if people
are free to act as they wish they become responsible for the consequences of
167. Hervey, “Migrant workers and their families in the European Union: The pervasive
market ideology of Community law”, in Shaw and More, op. cit. supra note 21, 91.
168. “Citizens in the European Union’s approach are the object of caretaking
policy-making, not its subjects” according to Neunreither, “Citizens and the exercise of power
in the European Union:Towards a new social contract?”, in Rosas andAntola, op. cit. supra note
36, p. 3; also Everson, op. cit. supra note 21, pp. 84–85: “The market citizen cannot command
the market…. It is the part which the citizen proper is expected to play”.
169. Splitter, op. cit. supra note 23, p. 270.
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their actions”.170 Thus female EU migrants are responsible for later risks of
worklessness – such as having a sick child – from the point they become
pregnant, and Zambrano carers are responsible for their destitution if they
choose to stay in a host Member State without benefits. Somek points to
Weber’s prediction that “responsibility” would come to rationalize our
indifference to poverty, as it “serves consistently the interest of those who are
too avaricious to give”.171 Here, it serves the interests of those unwilling to
extend protection to non-nationals. This also helps reshape our thinking in
terms of fairness.
The construction of EU citizenship around migrant work helps to fortify
broader activation principles that relocate national welfare entitlement,
putting groups such as the disabled and lone parents at greater risk of social
and financial exclusion.172 The fact that such exclusions go relatively
unquestioned173 in a migration context helps to make national welfare systems
more receptive174 to the soft law aims of responsibilization and activation,175
and helps to normalize the targeting of “the inactive… like disabled, lone
mothers, women at home, early retired, or those on sick leave”.176 The
ideological thrust of the Union’s policy message is clear – “more people need
to work”177 and benefits must be withdrawn to decrease “the burden for the
welfare system”.178 As with EU migrants, non-workers are considered
170. Collier et al., op. cit. supra note 166, 11.
171. Somek, Engineering Equality (OUP, 2011), p. 87.
172. Haux highlights some policy gaps in “Activating lone parents: An evidence-based
policy appraisal of the 2008 welfare-to-work reform in Britain”, (2010) ISER Working Paper
No. 2010–29.
173. Cf. an analysis of regional inequity – Strumia, “Remedying the inequalities of
economic citizenship in Europe: Cohesion policy and the negative right to move”, 17 ELJ
(2011), 725.
174. The influence of EU law upon national welfare reform and welfare discourse in the UK
is charted in O’Brien, op. cit. supra note 4.
175. Flexicurity (A key policy objective, see “Flexicurity”, DG Employment, social affairs
and inclusion, <ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=102&langId=en>, last accessed 11 Aug.
2013) is undoubtedly an activation measure – in the Commission Communication “Towards
common principles of flexicurity”, SEC(2007)861-2 COM(2007)359 final, there were 36
mentions of active labour market policies.
176. Public employment services 2020 working group PES and EU 2020: making the
employment guidelines work (2011), adopted by heads of PES in Budapest, Hungary on 23–24
June 2011, 4.
177. European Commission, DG Employment, social affairs and inclusion, “Agenda for
new skills and jobs”, at <ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=958&langId=en>, last accessed
11 Aug. 2013.
178. Council working party on social questions: “Towards common principles of flexicurity
– Draft Council conclusions”, (2007) SOC 476 ECOFIN 483, Annex, Common principles (3).
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inactive and irresponsible,179 and the withdrawal of protection has little regard
for the quality, rather than simple quantity of work.180 The emphasis is on
reducing State support and State costs,181 and so activation principles have
been criticized as ignoring just redistribution in favour of the bare minimum to
force people back into the labour market.182 The responsibilization paradigm
is an EU-wide phenomenon of questionable efficacy,183 but market
citizenship, with its economic conditions for acquiring full personal status
within EU law, has the same roots and aims as activation measures which
centre on the “homo economicus”184 and “neutralize the varied lived realities
of non-employment (for example [parenting, or caring for a disabled adult, or
being ill or disabled)”.185 It stigmatizes those not in paid work; while Wright
suggests that activation makes employment the “only valid source of
well-being”,186 market citizenship makes employment the only valid source of
complete being in the Union.
The linkage between market citizenship and activation measures is
especially clear where activationist welfare reforms target non-nationals, such
as the Zambrano reforms in the UK, explored earlier. A further UK example is
provided by the future benefit “Universal Credit”. This replaces a number of
existing benefits, and contains a Child Element to replace existing Child Tax
179. A report for the Commission emphasizes the “strong self-activity and self-
responsibility of the job-seeker,” “From employment to ‘activation’and self-responsibility”,The
role of the Public Employment Services related to “Flexicurity” in the European Labour
Markets, VC/2007/0927 Final report (March 2009, Policy and BusinessAnalysis), 37.
180. A problem highlighted in the French activation measures by Beraud and Eydoux, who
note the creation of low wage and low status jobs. “Redefining unemployment and employment
statuses: The impact of activation on social citizenship in France”, in Betzelt and Bothfeld, op.
cit. supra note 97.
181. A key objective of the measures according to the Council of Ministers is to reduce state
costs: (EPSCO) Joint Employment Report 7396/11 (2011) (2).
182. Betzelt and Bothfeld, op. cit. supra note 97.
183. E.g. Bothfeld and Betzelt have criticized the focus on cheap and short term strategies
in Germany: “The erosion of social status: The case of Germany” in ibid.; see also Nybom,
“Activation and ‘coercion’ among Swedish social assistance claimants with different work
barriers and socio-demographic characteristics: What is the logic?”, 22 International Journal
SocialWelfare (2013), 45–57. Knijn et al. describe the Netherlands as having developed “within
ten years a ‘shock and awe’ policy towards lone parents”. Knijn, Martin and Millar, “Activation
as a common framework for social policies towards lone parents”, 41 Social Policy &
Administration (2007), 638, 650. See also Dostal, “The workfare illusion: Re-examining the
concept and the British case”, 42 Social Policy andAdministration (2008), 19; and Larkin, “The
legislative arrival and future of workfare: The Welfare Reform Act 2009”, 18 Journal of Social
Security Law (2011), 11.
184. Betzelt and Bothfeld, op. cit. supra note 97, p. 13.
185. Wright, “Relinquishing rights?The impact of activation on citizenship for lone parents
in the UK”, in Betzelt and Bothfeld, ibid., p. 65.
186. Ibid.
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Credit. Current plans are to only pay it to claimants whose children are
actually present in the UK.187 Although the regulations do not require certain
EEA nationals to be “habitually resident”, they emphasize a new188 “basic
condition to be in Great Britain”.189 The UK is not the only site of
immigrant-targeting reforms. Breidahl also notes how Danish welfare
reforms single out immigrants (including EU migrants).190 The introduction
allowance was created specifically for immigrants and Danish returners who
were out of the country for seven years or more, providing an allowance
between 35–50% lower than the standard social assistance; Briedahl quotes
the Minister for Employment defending the policy choice to “activate”
immigrants in particular.191
The suspicion of EU migrants infuses EU citizenship, reshaping our ideas
of civic relationships, humanity and fairness, ideas that in turn mould our
attitudes to the purpose and shape of welfare.192 The responsibility model of
fairness has something in common with Rawls’ equality of opportunity,193
which assumes a game theory approach in which fairness is about “what’s fair
for me”,194 not about the sort of society we wish to live in. But fairness is not
an objective concept; there is a whole discipline of fairness theory to indicate
that it is open to contestation,195 and it is possible to invoke other constructions
187. The Universal Credit Regulations, SI 2013 No. 376, Reg. 4(7).
188. Hitherto, Regulation 883/2004 On the coordination of social security systems, O.J.
2004, L 166/1 had meant that Child Tax Credit was required to be paid with respect to children
in other Member States of migrant worker parents in the UK: “Child benefit and child tax credit
for children resident in other EEA countries”, House of Commons library, social policy section
SN06561, 13 Feb. 2013, at <www.parliament.uk/briefing-papers/SN06561.pdf>, last accessed
11 Aug. 2013.
189. DWP, Guidance for decision makers “International issues: Chapter C1: Universal
Credit”: section 1050: “Persons with certain specific rights to reside are not subject to the
requirement that they be habitually resident…they only need to be present in GB”, at
<www.dwp.gov.uk/docs/admc1.pdf>, last accessed 11 Aug. 2013.
190. Breidahl, “Social security provision targeted at immigrants – A forerunner for the
general change of Scandinavian equal citizenship? A Danish case study”, in Betzelt and
Bothfeld, op. cit. supra note 97, p. 50.
191. Ibid.
192. On the relationship between suspicion and fairness, see Bostedta and Brännlund,
“Rationality, fairness and the cost of distrust”, 41 The Journal of Socio-Economics (2012), 345.
193. Rawls, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement (Harvard University Press, 2001).
194. In that within the Rawlsian construct terms of a social contract are set according to
what each person would accept, serving each participant’s rational advantage.
195. Cappelen et al have concluded that there is considerable heterogeneity of conceptions
of fairness and responsibility. Cappelen, Sørensen and Tungodden, “Responsibility for what?
Fairness and individual responsibility”, 54 European Economic Review (2010), 429; see also
Corcho, “A proposal to unify some concepts in the theory of fairness”, 101 Journal of Economic
Theory (2001), 540; Egger and Kreickemeier, “Fairness, trade, and inequality”, 86 Journal of
International Economics (2012), 184; Fong, “Social preferences, self-interest, and the demand
for redistribution”, 82 Journal of Public Economics (2001), 225; Kamas and Preston,
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of fairness, equality and justice.196 In a study on social protection adequacy,
Nelson concluded that an emphasis on the principles of activation – principles
governing EU market citizenship – “may have affected the moral foundations
of European welfare states in terms of providing just social minimums”.197
The way in which a fractured, economic personhood impacts upon our sense
of morality is examined in the next section.
4.1. The market as the new morality
Investing economic mobility with, and so divesting persons of, legal rights,
undermines the moral claims of the law; it is here submitted that people are the
fundamental moral units of society.198 The irony of individualism is that it
overlooks individuals, those fundamental moral units, whereas an approach
that instead emphasizes the duties of society has a better chance of protecting
the interests of individuals, especially the vulnerable. A failure to question the
ideology behind market citizenship could mean that we sleepwalk from a
market economy to a market society – two things which Sandel reminds us are,
and should be kept, conceptually distinct.199 What has been presented as a
natural and logical progression in the EU context, economic citizenship,
echoes policies that would appear more clearly politically loaded in a
domestic context.200
The market origins of EU citizenship vest social protection rights in paid
work. This has a detrimental impact upon those excluded, who may be left
destitute, and upon the moral fabric of society, which may tolerate destitution.
But it might also damage the workers, insofar as they are instrumentalized and
commodified; they are meaningful as units of labour. This form of rights
“Distributive and reciprocal fairness: What can we learn from the heterogeneity of social
preferences”, 33 Journal of Economic Psychology (2012), 538.
196. Drawing upon, e.g., Dworkin’s focus on equality of welfare and resources: Dworkin,
“What is equality? Part 1: Equality of welfare”, 1 Philosophy & Public Affairs (1981), 185; id.,
“What is equality? Part 2: Equality of resources”, 10 Philosophy & Public Affairs (1981), 283;
and Sen’s suggestion that justice should be about advancement not just creating idealized or
transcendent models – Sen, The Idea of Justice (Penguin, 2010).
197. Nelson, “Social assistance and EU poverty thresholds 1990–2008. Are European
welfare systems providing just and fair protection”, 29 European Sociological Review (2013),
387.
198. As Splitter contests it is “persons whose interests and concerns ought to be taken most
seriously in ethical judgment and decision making”, op. cit. supra note 23, 258.
199. Sandel,What Money Can’t Buy: The Moral Limits of Markets (Penguin, 2012).
200. E.g. William Simon’s work in the US on economic citizenship was about making
“personal liberty” paramount, and rejecting the “coercive levelling of egalitarianism”: Simon,
A Time for Truth (Readers Digest Press, McGraw-Hill, 1978), p. 223.
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allocation in the Union is perhaps unsurprising,201 but it is nevertheless
philosophically challenging – and has been for some time.202 The
commodification of workers within EU free movement law was criticized by
Peebles,203 who suggested that “it is only as a citizen-worker that … one is
granted the many rights accorded to commodities in the treaties” – though this
was before the rise of “social” citizenship case law, which has since obscured,
rather than replaced, the commodification process.
In spite of claims by different Advocates General that the migrant worker is
“not a mere source of labour, but a human being”,204 and that labour is not to
be regarded as a commodity,205 the EU free movement and social entitlement
framework treats people as means for furthering the ends of the internal
market.206 And that social banner impacts upon conceptions of welfare,
humanity and human rights. The “fundamental” language imbuing
citizenship, which is intrinsically connected to free movement,207 rather
confuses the area of fundamental human rights, so that fundamental rights and
fundamental freedoms are conflated. Back in 1997, Peebles, quoting Weiler
and Lockhart, conceded that the ECJ had not yet “elevated market rights to
human rights”.208 However, it is submitted that it now has done so, helped by
the discourse of citizenship blurring the boundaries between a market-based
201. Weiler pointed out in 1991 that we were dealing with a “highly politicized choice of
ethos, ideology, and political culture: the culture of ‘the market’… [seeking] to remove barriers
to the free movement of factors of production”, in id., “The transformation of Europe”, 100 Yale
Law Journal (1991), 2477.
202. Ellerman points to Sabine’s suggestion that Cicero and Chrysippus were against
treating men as living tools, and suggests the Stoics made similar arguments (Ellerman,
“Inalienable rights: A litmus test for liberal theories of justice”, 29 Law and Philosophy (2010),
571) Kant famously denounced human instrumentalization, since rational beings “should not
be used merely as means”, in Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals
(“Transition from popular moral philosophy”), 1785; translation Kingsmill Abbott.
Schumpeter linked commodification with increasing inequality, insecurity and resentment: id.,
“Growing hostility” in Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (Start Publishing LLC, 2012).
More recently, inalienable rights theorists such as Ellerman have criticized the notion that rights
are vested in anything other than people, and feminist theorists criticize the objectification
process that commodification entails: Nussbaum, “Objectification”, 24 Philosophy & Public
Affairs (1995), 249.
203. Peebles, op. cit. supra note 21.
204. A.G. Trabucchi in Case 7/75, Mr and Mrs F v. Belgium, [1975] ECR 696.
205. A.G. Jacobs in Bettray, cited supra note 26, 17.
206. Particularly evident in social dumping and worker posting cases, where workers are
moved as cheap living tools. Joerges and Rödl, “Informal politics, formalised law and the
‘social deficit’ of European integration: Reflections after the judgments of the ECJ in Viking
and Laval”, 15 ELJ (2009), 1.
207. Iida, cited supra note 63, 72.
208. Peebles, op. cit. supra note 21, 608.
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and human-based right.209 In practice, it has gone further, to elevate them
above human rights, since the latter are frequently on the “back foot” if they
are conceived as interferences with fundamental freedoms which must be
justified.210
The 1990s commentary recognized that equal ranking was inadequate,211
because market freedoms should not be equated with inherent human rights.
Since the promotion of market freedoms, however, equal ranking seems to be
the best approach on offer, as propounded by Trstenjak and Beysen,212 and as
partly adopted in Schmidberger.213 But this demotes the importance of the
person in herself, and suggests a moral content to market objectives.214 While
Sandel has argued that markets tend to crowd out morals,215 and Somek that
market based rationality is treated as stronger than morality,216 it is argued
here that in using economic citizens to displace persons, and deploying the
language of fundamental rights and fairness, the market is treated asmorality,
which is arguably more potent.
If we step back and, instead of treating economic mobility as the epicentre
of moral value, consider the consequences of market citizenship, we must ask
how morally coherent the rights cliff edges are. To refer back to the cases
mentioned in this article: is it moral that a woman who gave up work, intending
to get another job once her child was born, is denied benefits and made
destitute, even though she could not go back to her home State because her
baby was so ill it was in hospital and could not be moved? Or is it moral that
a tax-paying, working family relying on a Ruiz Zambrano right to reside to
enable UK national children to remain in the Union should not be entitled to
benefits designed to prevent child poverty? Or is it moral that the destruction
of a family, and possibly devastating effects upon a child’s future, should
depend upon the parent’s command of sufficient economic resources to
209. As evident in the fundamentalizing language: Wollenschläger, “A new fundamental
freedom beyond market integration: Union citizenship and its dynamics for shifting the
economic paradigm of European Integration”, 17 ELJ (2011), 1.
210. As argued in Spaventa, “Federalisation versus centralisation: Tensions in fundamental
rights discourse in the EU”, in Dougan and Currie, op. cit supra note 165.
211. Coppel and O’Neill, “The European Court of Justice: Taking rights seriously?”, 29
CML Rev. (1992), 669; Weiler and Lockhart, “‘Taking rights seriously’seriously:The European
Court and its fundamental rights jurisprudence – Part I”, 32 CML Rev. (1995), 51–94; Peebles,
op. cit. supra note 21.
212. Trstenjak and Beysen, op. cit. supra note 15.
213. Case C-112/00, Schmidberger, [2003] ECR I-5659 (where freedoms where also
characterized as potential intrusions into fundamental rights, para 80).
214. See De Búrca, “The language of rights and European integration”, in Shaw and More,
op. cit. supra note 21; Coppel and O’Neill, op. cit. supra note 211.
215. Sandel, op. cit. supra note 199.
216. Somek, op. cit. supra note 105 and 171.
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exercise free movement? In accepting notions of economic responsibility we
dodge questions of right and wrong.217
Clearly a change of approach would provoke criticism – not least
accusations of inappropriate competence expansion. Reverse discrimination,
by which mobile citizens are favoured above static ones, may be seen as a
necessary side effect218 to drawing up limits to the scope of EU law, while the
other results noted above are the consequence of limited social affairs
competence and non-harmonization.219 But it is nonetheless important to
recognize openly the effects of the system we have, to challenge its claims to
fairness, and to defrock market citizenship of its moral robes. Unless we know
what we have, we cannot make sensible decisions about possible change.
Welfare is an example of an area in which governments must “constantly
survey and alter [their] rules of property”, as Dworkin points out, adding that
the norms of the market are inappropriate tools for the task, since they assume
“the adequacy of the scheme already in place”.220
The will of the legislature and that of the Member States as masters of the
Union may be invoked to suggest that the outcomes above are condoned, and
that a more comprehensive notion of non-commodified personhood would not
be tolerated. The patchwork results from the fact that the Member States want
to carve up rights, to stratify people, and to allow many to fall through
the gaps. There is some truth in this argument – as evident in the torrent
of negative interventions with each new citizenship case. National
xenoscepticism and reticence in contemplating European level social rights
push the Union to an economistic minimalist approach, thickening the veil of
non-interference under which a market agenda is pushed forwards as though
ideologically neutral. But maybe the rights of citizenship ought not to be
delineated according to the reluctance of Member States to treat each others’
nationals as in some way united to their own. To do so would suggest we have
not come far from Weiler’s diagnosis that the Union’s value “is measured
ultimately and exclusively with the coin of national utility and not community
solidarity”.221 Whatever the answer, the veil of non-interference is misleading;
217. Sandel claims political liberalism generally swerves questions of “comprehensive
moral ideals” – he suggests political liberalism would “have a hard time explaining, in 1858,
why Lincoln was right and Douglas was wrong”, “Political liberalism”, in Justice: A Reader
(OUP, 2007), p. 369.
218. Or a “necessary evil” – Ritter, “Purely internal situations, reverse discrimination,
Guimont, Dzodzi and Article 234”, 31 EL Rev. (2006), 690.
219. Since the Union’s competence “shall not affect the right of Member States to define
the fundamental principles of their social security systems and must not significantly affect the
financial equilibrium thereof ” (Art. 153(4) TFEU).
220. Dworkin, Law’s Empire (Hart, 1998), p. 310.
221. Weiler, op. cit. supra note 201, 2481.
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claims that welfare is inherently a national issue222 are simply counterfactual.
The EU is highly active in social policy areas, and the responsibilization
agenda applied to migrants has wide ramifications.223 As Chomsky has noted,
judicial decisions and intellectual commentary, not legislation, have
transformed conceptions of human rights and democracy.224 Deference to the
legislature does not make EU citizenship ideologically neutral, or immutable,
and it does not discharge the duty of moral scrutiny.
Such scrutiny is even more important should the constraints of scope and
competence be used to suggest that dissent is impossible, especially in the
context of increased conceptual convergence around market ideals.225 While
O’Connell claims there is a shared, albeit unconscious global judicial
sphere,226 even stronger claims can be made of the EU and its Member States,
thanks to an explicitly shared judiciary, shared legal norms, and shared market
objectives.227 The nature of the EU may make its positioning with regard to
the individual predictable, but it is important to at least recognize it. Otherwise
through bridging terms like citizenship we start unwittingly importing those
principles into erstwhile non-market aspects of society. Welfare is the key
example here, but others include employment strategies, responses to the
economic crisis and the construction of human rights.228
222. Majone claims that “fairly homogeneous communities” are necessary for legitimately
making “delicate value judgments about the appropriate balance of efficiency and equity”: id.,
“Europe’s ‘Democratic deficit’: The question of standards”, 4 ELJ (1998), 14.
223. Somek describes “[m]ajor effects on the national social welfare state [that] originate
from the individual pursuit of economic objectives”, op. cit. supra note 105, 227, while Offe
suggests that the EU requires nations to “unlearn” policy objectives, and “partially demolish
entrenched institutional patterns”. Offe, “The European model of ‘social’ capitalism: Can it
survive European integration?”, 11 The Journal of Political Philosophy (2003), 463.
224. Chomsky, op. cit. supra note 87.
225. Calling to mind the catechism of Thatcherism (TINA – “There is no alternative”) used
to push a neo-liberal agenda. See Levy, “Between neo-liberalism and no liberalism: Progressive
approaches to economic liberalization in Western Europe”, in Eichengreen, Stiefel and
Landesmann, The European Economy in an American Mirror (Routledge, 2008).
226. O’Connell, op. cit. supra note 12, charting a neo-liberal convergence between South
Africa, Ireland, India and Canada.
227. The idea of activationist convergence is explored in Eichhorst and Konle-Seidi,
“Contingent convergence: A comparative analysis of activation policies”, Institute for the Study
of Labor, Discussion Paper Series IZA DP No. 3905 (Dec. 2008).
228. The UK case of McDonald saw budgetary constraints play a key role in determining
whether Art. 8 ECHR and a right to reasonable adjustment had been infringed: The Queen on
the application of Elaine McDonald v. Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea, [2010]
EWCA Civ 1109, 66; Rix LJ stated that there was no such breach, because the error in assessing
the claimant’s care needs was the result of “the difficult task of balancing its desire to assist Ms
McDonald with its responsibilities to all its clients within the limited resources available to it in
its budget” (66). It was appealed to the Supreme Court which approved the Court of Appeal’s
judgment.
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While it is beyond the scope of this paper to address possible ways forward,
it is submitted that an accurate depiction of the terrain is the first requirement.
It is necessary to ask whether social justice is an objective of the Union, and to
give an honest appraisal of whether it is being delivered. Doing so requires
unpicking the enmeshed concepts of citizenship, fundamental rights and
fundamental freedoms, to expose, rather than obscure, serious ideological
tensions between different constructions of welfare (including those based on
need), the recognition of inherent personal rights, and the logic of the market,
by which people are treated as factors of production. O’Leary noted these
tensions in 1995, suggesting that Community law was then not “equipped to
interfere to a greater extent in the determination and regulation of social
policy”.229 But such involvement in social policy is now commonplace, and
the discourse of citizenship to enhance the moral credentials of economic
personhood may mean that decisions about the type of society in which we
want to live, about justice, and about social protection, get sucked into the
neoliberal slipstream.
5. Conclusion
The economic preoccupations of the Union have long since been the subject of
discussion and debate, though such critiques have fallen a little into desuetude
in recent years, probably because developments in the creation of a social
European agenda, and the fundamentalizing of European citizenship is
thought to have taken us beyond the worker-commodity paradigm. This paper
has argued that not only have we not left it behind, it is more implicitly
accepted than before. Through the language of citizenship and fundamental
citizenship-based rights, economic personhood has been endowed with the
ultimate moral virtue – economic responsibility, so that vesting migrant rights
in economic activity, rather than in persons, becomes an expression of
“fairness”. Thus the commodification process has become more ingrained,
automatic and less susceptible to dispute.
In focussing closely on the separate citizenship increments, we lose sight of
the overall pattern, and accept the gaps in between. It is in falling over rights
cliff edges and losing entitlement to social protection that one loses legal
recognition and becomes a market irrelevance (or worse, burden) – a
non-person. Since economic mobility is the one certain route to full
citizenship rights, and to being a full EU citizen, it becomes the one known
principle – like Descartes’ act of thinking – to establish a person’s Union
existence – hence “I trade, therefore I am”.
229. O’Leary, op. cit. supra note 36, 181.
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A multitude of circumstances lead to cliff edges, demonstrating a refusal on
the part of Member States to conceive of a genuine “fundamental” shared
status and destiny. An example here analysed is the case of Zambrano carers,
who may be exercising an EU-based right to reside, and may be working, but
may still be excluded from national social protection measures. Even claiming
to fall within the scope of Union law is likely to become difficult due to a rigid
approach taken to “enjoyment of citizenship rights” as amounting to no more
than protection from de facto expulsion from the EU, resulting in a very high
tolerance of destitution and intrusions into family life that do not prioritize the
best interests of the children. This example may in time be ameliorated if
pronounced upon by the ECJ, but such exclusions practised nationally speak
to a constant and intense domestic curbing of rights accorded to non-nationals,
and a desire to confine the reach of cases to narrow sets of facts – a desire
made more realisable when working with the patchy, not necessarily humane,
provisions of market citizenship.
The dehumanizing effect of delimited separate personhoods, and the
attachment of rights to economic conditions does not result in neutral, random
exclusions. This paper has examined the gender tilt of social entitlement
within EU law, identifying pregnancy/maternity and care gaps, not only in the
definition of work which centres upon remuneration (rectification of which
would require quite a conceptual, progressive upheaval), but also in the risks
for which worker status, and so a personhood that attracts social protection, is
retained. These gaps are indicative of a broader tilt against the recognition of
reproductive and care work, and its treatment as a chosen leisure activity, to be
paid for with one’s European legal status. Women are thus more likely to be
tipped over rights cliff edges – edges that divide the full rights-attracting
citizens from those without any social protection entitlement. Market
citizenship thus cannot be rational, innate or the only possible form of
personhood within the Union; it is a fabrication reflecting existing power
imbalances.
This fragmented set of statuses risks divesting the person of legal content,
and so, if we accept the person as the fundamental moral unit of society,
divesting the law of moral content. It is here argued that the language of
citizenship has been deployed in paradoxically individualistic ways,
promoting a particular conception of fairness as intrinsically bound up with
“responsibility”, in line with notions of fair competition. This shift, or
linguistic capture, hints that we may have accepted the foundations of a market
society, not just a market economy. The responsibility paradigm codified in
free movement law, and applied to non-nationals, echoes the activationist calls
in EU soft law, and domestic welfare reform. Activation and responsibility are
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presented as moral imperatives; the market is imbued, through invocations of
fairness and responsibility, with a misleading glow of moralism.
The commanding moral power of the language of citizenship and
fundamental free movement rights entrenches and edifies our commitment to
a market agenda. This agenda should come as no surprise, but it is obscured by
the discourse of social and human rights – rights which are demoted in
importance if characterized as equivalent to market based rights, and demoted
still further if treated as obstacles to the market. Muddiness of terminology
and conceptual confusion mean we might not think to assess the morality of
the eventual decision making, and whether those outcomes represent the sort
of society in which we want to live, and whether they accord with whatever
constructions society holds at a given time of right and wrong.
The challenges in reconfiguring European social law are plentiful and clear
– not least of which are delimiting the scope of EU law and respecting the
reluctance of Member States to relinquish aspects of welfare competence. But
those challenges are not decisive, nor always philosophically or legally
persuasive – for instance, when the protected aspects of welfare law are
xenosceptic. And those difficulties should not present practical closure, or be
cause for passive ideological resignation. They demand a thorough and honest
assessment of the social structures and institutions currently in place.
Otherwise, the same current that pitches people over rights cliff edges will
engulf and erode notions of justice and stifle debate about the collective
responsibilities of society.
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